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FAMILIES FOR TAX PURPOSES: WHAT ABOUT THE STEPS?
Wendy C. Gerzog*
At least 4.4 million families in the United States are blended ones that include
stepchildren and stepparents. For tax purposes, these "steps" receive preferential
treatment as a result of their status because, on the one hand, they are treated as
family members for many income tax benefit sections, but on the other hand, are
excluded from the definition of family member for business entity attribution pur-
poses and for gift and estate tax anti-abuse provisions. In the interests of fairness
and uniformity, steps should be treated as family members for all tax purposes
where they act like their biological or adoptive counterparts, regardless of whether
such treatment would decrease or increase their tax burden.
I. INTRODUCTION
At least 4.4 million families in the United States are blended
ones that include stepchildren and stepparents.1 For tax purposes,
these "steps ' receive preferential treatment as a result of their
status because, on the one hand, they are treated as family mem-
bers for many income tax benefit sections, but on the other hand,
are excluded from the definition of family member for business
entity attribution purposes and for gift and estate tax anti-abuse
provisions. In the interests of fairness and uniformity, steps should
be treated as family members for all tax purposes where they act
like their biological or adoptive counterparts, regardless of
whether such treatment decreases or increases their tax burden.
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank Professors
Neil H. Buchanan, Patricia A. Cain, Lily Kahng, Sarah B. Lawsky, Leandra Lederman, Char-
lene D. Luke, John A. Lynch, Jr., Roberta F. Mann, Beverly I. Moran,Jane C. Murphy, Henry
M. Ordower, James R. Repetti, Ann-Marie Rhodes, Diane M. Ring, Mildred W. Robinson,
Elizabeth J. Samuels, Nancy Shurtz, Dr. Bonnie L. Webber, Harry S. Cohen, and Marcia
Rubin for their very helpful suggestions on this Article.
1. RoSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN:
2000 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf.
2. As used throughout this Article, the term "step" refers to the family of a spouse
who enters a marriage with children from a prior relationship. Therefore, upon marriage, a
father or mother's spouse becomes a stepmother or stepfather, respectively. That father or
mother or his or her biological or adopted family members will refer to their stepmother or
stepfather's family members as various "steps," including stepsister, stepbrother, stepgrand-
parent, etc.
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With a wicked stepmother and stepsisters, the fairytale of Cinder-
ella presents only half the story. Undoubtedly, many steprelatives
are very dear and inseparable from their biological or adopted
equivalents. Today, a minimum of five percent of American house-
holds contain at least one steprelative Reflecting this reality, family
law has expanded the definition of family to include stepparents.5
Tax law also addresses family units," whether through income taxes
that allow for dependency exemptions, corporate taxes that define
attribution rules to determine family control,8 or wealth transfer
taxes that incorporate presumptions 9 or valuation rules dependent
3. Versions of the folktale were written by, or attributable to, among others, Charles
Perrault, Mother Goose, and the Brothers Grimm. See also Daniel B. Evans, Tax Clauses to Die
For, PROB. & PROP.,July/Aug. 2006, at 38.
4. The 2000 census data recorded that about 5 percent of stepchildren under 18 lived
in U.S. households, but the Census Bureau estimates that those figures account for only two-
thirds of those who actually do so because the figures do not include stepchildren living in a
household where the child's biological parent is not the householder. That percentage also
does not include the additional almost 2 percent of stepchildren aged 18 or older who were
similarly situated. Moreover, the data does not include stepchildren who have been adopted
by a stepparent. Adoptions may account for a significant percentage of all stepchildren.
TAVIA SIMMONS & GRACE O'NEILL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2000
2-3,6, 16,21 (2001).
5. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03, at 107 (2002) ("Unless otherwise specified,
a parent is either a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, or a de facto parent"); id., § 2.18, cmt.
b., at 385-86 (defining defacto parents as "an allocation [of responsibility to individuals other
than legal parents] that would otherwise be made to a de facto parent may be limited or
denied if, in light of the number of other adults to be allocated responsibility, the allocation
is impractical. The situation to which this provision applies will be rare, given the strict crite-
ria defining a de facto parent. It may occur, however, when a child has two legal parents, a
prior stepparent who is a de facto parent with some custodial responsibility under a prior
parenting plan, and a more recent stepparent who has been providing the primary care for
the child, all of whom live in separate households and seek custodial responsibility for the
child.").
6. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. Rv. 1389,
1391 (1975) ("A persistent problem in the theory of income taxation is whether natural
persons should be taxed as isolated individuals, or as social beings whose family ties to other
taxpayers affect their taxpaying capacity.").
7. See I.R.C. § 151(e) (3) (1954) (defining "child" as the taxpayer's "son, stepson,
daughter, or stepdaughter"); id. § 152(a) (defining "dependent" to include the following
step relations: "(2) A stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer, (3) A brother, sister, step-
brother, or stepsister of the taxpayer ... (5) A stepfather or stepmother of the taxpayer").
For the purpose of calculating whether a child's parents provide over one-half of that child's
support, "in the case of the remarriage of a parent, support of a child received from the
parent's spouse shall be treated as received from the parent." I.R.C. § 152(c) (6) (2006).
8. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 318, 355,447 (2006).
9. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2701, 2702 (wherein retained rights and interests in a family
transfer context are presumed to have a zero value and to constitute a gift); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2703-1(b) (3) (2008) ("A right or restriction is considered to meet each of the three
requirements described in paragraph (b) (1) of this section if more than 50 percent by value
of the property subject to the right or restriction is owned directly or indirectly (within the
meaning of section 25.2701-6) by individuals who are not members of the transferor's fam-
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upon family relationships.' ° There are many income tax statutes
that either themselves refer to steps or reference dependency ex-
emption definitions that include steps. These provisions accord
preferential tax treatment with respect to certain fringe," educa-
tion, 2 legal, 3 and medical 4 benefits, as well as exemptions from
penalties for certain early distributions to steprelatives from some
ily."); Special Valuation Rules for Purposes of the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 56 Fed. Reg.
14321, 14324-14325 (Apr. 9, 1991) (explaining that, when Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1 was pro-
posed, "[t]his general rule does not apply to any right or restriction that: (1) Is a bona fide
business arrangement; (2) is not a device to transfer the property to members of the dece-
dent's family for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth; and
(3) is an arrangement the terms of which are comparable to similar arrangements entered
into by persons in arm's length transactions. Consistent with the legislative history, the pro-
posed regulations clarify that these three tests are independently applied. An agreement
exclusively among unrelated parties (who are not the natural objects of each others bounty)
is presumed to meet these tests."); Deduction for Claims Against the Estate, 56 Fed. Reg.
20080, 20084-20085 (proposed Apr. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 20) ("Rela-
tionships with and among a decedent and the decedent's family members, related entities,
and beneficiaries may create the potential for collusion in asserting invalid or exaggerated
claims in order to reduce the decedent's taxable estate. Thus, notwithstanding § 20.2053-1
and paragraph (a) of this section, there will be a rebuttable presumption that claims by a
family member of the decedent, a related entity, or a beneficiary of the decedent's estate or
revocable trust are not legitimate and bona fide and therefore are not deductible. Evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption may include evidence that the claim arises from circum-
stances that would reasonably support a similar claim by unrelated persons or non-
beneficiaries .... For purposes of this section, family members include the spouse of the
decedent; the grandparents, parents, siblings, and lineal descendants of the decedent or of
the decedent's spouse; and the spouse and lineal descendants of any such grandparent,
parent, and sibling. Family members include adopted individuals. For purposes of this sec-
tion, a related entity is an entity in which the decedent, either directly or indirectly, had a
beneficial ownership interest at the time of the decedent's death or at any time during the
three-year period ending on the decedent's date of death. Such an entity, however, shall not
include a publicly-traded entity nor shall it include a closely-held entity in which the com-
bined beneficial interest, either direct or indirect, of the decedent and the decedent's family
members, collectively, is less than thirty percent of the beneficial ownership interests
(whether voting or non-voting."); I.R.C. § 672(c) (2006) ("For the purposes of subsection
(f) and sections 674 and 675, a related or subordinate party shall be presumed to be subser-
vient to the grantor in respect of the exercise or nonexercise of the powers conferred on
him unless such party is shown not to be subservient by a preponderance of the evidence.").
Courts often state that intra-family transfers are presumed to be gifts. See infra note 52.
10. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2701-2704 (2006).
11. I.R.C. § 132 (2006) (exclusion for certain employee fringe benefits, such as airline
tickets to airline employees and employee discounts for retail employees).
12. I.R.C. § 529 (2006) (qualified tuition programs); id. § 221 (deduction for interest
on certain higher education loans).
13. I.R.C. § 120 (2006) (exclusion for certain benefits from qualified group legal ser-
vices plans).
14. I.R.C. § 105 (2006) (exclusion for some employee benefits under certain accident
and health plans); id. § 213 (itemized deduction for certain medical care expenses); id.
§ 220 (deduction for payments to an Archer MSA); id. § 223 (deduction for payments to
health savings accounts); and id. § 402 (exclusion for certain distributions from governmen-
tal plans for health and long-term care insurance). See also I.R.C. § 214(c)(1)(A) (1954)
(allowing medical deductions for the taxpayer's dependent child or stepchild under the age
12).
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retirement plans.'5 Occasionally, steps are also included in the
definition of "related individuals," denying them some tax advan-
tages, 16 but this negative consequence rarely occurs; more often
than not, steps are not treated as relatives like their biological or
adopted equivalents in anti-abuse statutes 7 and thus escape the
negative tax consequences of being recognized as a family mem-
ber.
Recently, legislators have recognized the need for uniformity in
the definition of family for purposes of the Tax Code and, specifi-
cally, in the definition of a qualifying child. The move towards
uniformity began in 2004 with five provisions that confer benefits
on those taxpayers, including steps, who have or take care of quali-
fying children. Thus, the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 200418
addressed several benefit provisions in the Tax Code that princi-
pally assist lower and moderate income taxpayers' 9 by providing a
uniform definition of "child" to simplify dependency exemptions,
head of household filing status,20 the child tax credit,21 the depend-
15. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 72(t), 409A (2006).
16. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§21(e)(6)(A), 51(i)(1)(A), 125(e)(1)(D), 129(c), 170(g)(1)
(2006).
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163, 267, 707, 1361 (2006).
18. The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, Title II § 201,
118 Stat. 1169, § 208 (2004). These amendments apply to taxable years after 2004. See H.R.
REP. No. 108-696 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029; see also Statement
by the President, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. S27; Tom Daley, Unintelligent Design: The Evolution of the
Uniform Definition of Child, 111 TAx NOTES 813, 813 (2006) ("Each of the five 'child tax sec-
tions' offers a tax break to a taxpayer who has a connection to another person (most often a
child) who meets specific qualifications."). While this legislation has generally been praised,
there are those who have criticized the uniform definition as creating more complexities as
well as injecting more inequities into the Tax Code. See Susan Simmonds, ABA Tax Section
Praises Unified Definition of 'Child,'105 TAX NOTES 671, 671 (2004) ("The American Bar Asso-
ciation Section of Taxation has given taxwriters a gold star for their development of a
unified definition of child.") But seeJohn Buckley, Uniform Definition of a Child: Large Unin-
tended Consequences, 110 TAx NOTEs 1345 (2006) (describing the uniform definition as a
fiasco); Daley, supra (finding the apparent simplicity of the uniform definition specious and
describing the complexities engendered by the legislation). Cf Nina E. Olson, Uniform
Qualifying Child Definition: Uniformity for Most Taxpayers, 111 TAx NOTES 225, 228 (2006)
("Let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater. In adopting a single definition of a child
where five definitions existed previously, Congress provided a monumental service to ap-
proximately 160 million Americans.").
19. Many of these benefit provisions are phased out for upper income taxpayers. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§24(b)(2), 34(a)(2)(B), 34(a)(b)(2), 34(a)(i), 151(d)(3) (2006). I.R.C.
§ 21(a)(2) (2006) provides less of a benefit for moderate income and wealthy taxpayers.
There are no income limitations to file as head of household. I.R.C. § 2(b) (2006).
20. Surviving spouse filing status also refers to section 152 definitions and requires the
taxpayer to maintain in her home a dependent "son, stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter."
I.R.C. § 2(a) (1) (B) (2006). However, this Code section was not part of the 2004 Act legisla-
tion. This language was used in the 1954 I.R.C. with respect to both surviving spouse and
head of household status. I.R.C. § 1 (b) (2) (A) (i)-2 (b) (1) (B) (1954).
21. I.R.C. § 24 (2006).
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ent care credit,22 and the earned income tax credit.2 3 According to
the legislative history of the 2004 Tax Act, the impetus for a uni-
form definition of a qualifying child for the purposes of these five
statutes was that:
Present law contains five commonly used provisions that pro-
vide benefits to taxpayers with children .... Each provision
has separate criteria for determining whether the taxpayer
qualifies for the applicable tax benefit with respect to a par-
ticular child .... Thus, a taxpayer is required to apply
different definitions to the same individual when determining
eligibility for these provisions, and an individual who qualifies
a taxpayer for one provision does not automatically qualify
the taxpayer for another provision. The use of different tests
... causes complexity for taxpayers and the IRS. The different
tests relating to qualifying children are a source of errors for
taxpayers both because the rules for each provision are differ-
ent and because of the complexity of particular rules. The
variety of rules cause taxpayers inadvertently to claim tax
benefits for which they do not qualify, as well as to fail to
claim tax benefits for which they do qualify. Adopting a uni-
form definition ... would achieve simplification by making it
easier for taxpayers to determine whether they qualify for the
various tax benefits relating to children, would reduce inad-
vertent taxpayer errors arising from confusion due to
differing rules, and would make the applicable provisions eas-
ier for the IRS to administer.24
Although popular among disparate groups, 5 many of the support-
ers of this legislation came from advocacy representatives of lower
26income taxpayers.
22. Id. § 21.
23. Id. § 34; see also Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. OF
GENDER RACE &JUST. 267, 287 (2002) ("In the past, adopted children, foster children, and
stepchildren have all been excluded from tax law definitions of 'child.' That omission has
been generally remedied.").
24. S. REP. No. 108-257, at 85 (2004); see also Staff of the joint Comm. on Tax'n, Simpli-
fication of the Internal Revenue Code, reprinted in 91 TAX NOTES 999 (2001).
25. See Robert F. Manning, Cuttings on the Conference Floor: Will the Grafts Take, 100 TAX
NOTES 217, 228 (2003) ("The JCT, the National Taxpayer Advocate, the Treasury, the ABA
Section of Taxation, the AICPA, TEI, and other professional groups have commented on the
current complexity and recommended a uniform definition of qualifying child."); Simplifica-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code, supra note 24, at 1002-1003 ("This recommendation would
provide simplification for substantial numbers of taxpayers.").
26. See David Lupi Sher, The Tax Bill-Congress Attempts to Overhaul EITC to Make It Tax-
payer-Friendly, 91 TAx NOTES 1661, 1663 (2001) ("Diana Leyden, a University of Connecticut
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
In contrast, Congress has not pushed corporate and transfer tax
provisions towards uniformity. This lag is most likely due to the fact
that maintaining the status quo serves the self-interest of many
wealthy taxpayers and voters. In these tax areas, extending uni-
formity to corporate control and wealth transfers (i.e., to the
highest income taxpayers and to those with the most wealth and
power) will not bring those taxpayers many benefits2' and indeed
may result in negative tax consequences. Nonetheless, this Article
will argue that such an extension of uniformity should occur for
the following reasons: first, complete uniformity in the definition
of "child" is preferable to a piecemeal, "pick and choose" tax pol-
icy; and second, such a change would more accurately reflect the
actual relationship between those steprelatives who share their
wealth and power.
Moreover, such an extension of uniformity is in line with subtle
changes in the Code reflecting the high rate of divorce and remar-
riage prevalent today.28 The 1986 generation skipping transfer tax,29
School of Law professor and a director of a low-income tax clinic ... [stated] 'The failure to
adopt a uniform definition of qualifying child will mean that those taxpayers who are least
able to handle complex tax laws may continue to be painted with a broad brush as cheats'
....); Simplification of the Tax System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 108th Congress 13 (2004) (statement of Elizabeth Maresca, Associate
Clinical Professor, Fordham University School of Law) ("It is my privilege to testify before
you and to urge you to adopt this much needed tax simplification proposal which will re-
place the current multiple definitions of a qualifying child with a single, sensible Uniform
Definition of a Qualifying Child. This change will benefit both low income taxpayers and the
IRS, as it makes our tax system more fair and efficient."). See also Gene Steuerle, How Com-
plexity Arises for Low-Income Taxpayers, 92 TAX NOTES 561, 562 (2001) ("The Joint Committee
on Taxation's recent recommendation to create a common definition of qualifying child for
many provisions affecting households with children is a solid one that is long overdue.").
This recommendation continues to resonate with low-income taxpayer advocates. See Testi-
mony of David Marzahl, Executive Director of the Center for Economic Progress, Issues,
Challenges, and Opportunities: Low-Income Taxpayers and the 7hx Code 8 ("Disparate treatment of
children within tax code creates unnecessary confusion and errors-new rules for 'uniform
definition of qualifying child' may help."); ADAM CARASSO, JEFFREY ROHALY, & C. EUGENE
STEUERLE, URBAN INST., A UNIFIED CHILDREN'S TAX CREDIT 1 (2005) ("This effort [the
proposal for a unified children's tax credit] follows on the heels of a number of proposals to
consolidate and strengthen tax programs that benefit low-income families and reflects the
spirit of the more uniform tax definition of a qualifying child that was enacted by the Work-
ing Families Tax Relief Act of 2004.").
27. There are the benefits of I.R.C. § 2032A (2006) and I.R.C. § 6166 (2006), for ex-
ample.
28. See ARTHUR J. NORTON & LOUISA F. MILLER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIAGE, DI-
VORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990's 5 (1992) ("High divorce rates create, among other
things, a large pool of eligibles for remarriage. Remarriage in the United States has become
a relatively common life course event. Currently more than 4 out of 10 marriages in the
United States involve a second or higher-order marriage for the bride, the groom, or
both.").
29. I.R.C. § 2601 (2006).
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the 1986 provision taxing unearned income of a minor," and, to
some extent, the valuation rules applicable to post-1990 gifts3' pro-
vide illustrations of how, at least with respect to more recently
enacted legislation, Congress has recognized that steprelatives are,
in many instances, akin to blood or adopted relatives. The 1996
enactment of qualified tuition plans 2 provides the broadest cover-
age of steps: by incorporating the definition of a "qualifying
relative" from the dependency exemption definitions33 for the des-
ignation of a member of the old beneficiary's family,34 this section
encompasses such wide ranging steps as stepchildren, stepgrand-
children, stepsiblings, and stepparents.3
While the income tax provisions have provided many tax benefits
to steps, the extension of a uniform application of the definition of
steprelative to include parallel steps 6 in the corporate and transfer
tax areas will generally be disadvantageous to steps. There may,
however, be some additional consequential benefits to wealthy steps
if state inheritance taxes follow the example of the federal regime,
which they often do. Some states already have inheritance tax stat-
utes that treat stepchildren the same as natural or adopted children,
often providing steps the benefit of exemptions from those taxes or
subjecting them to the lower rate enjoyed by natural and adopted
children.3 ' For example, Maryland treats stepchildren (current and
30. I.R.C. § I (g) (2006).
31. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (2006).
32. I.R.C. § 529 (2006) (qualified tuition plans) was enacted by the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, Title I, § 1806(a), 110 Stat. 1895 (1996).
33. I.R.C. § 152(d)(2)(A)-(G) (2006). Under this provision, not only are steps in-
cluded as family members, but certain in-laws are included as well. See I.R.C. § 152(d) (2) (G)
(2006).
34. I.R.C. § 529(e)(2) (2006) ("(A) the spouse of such beneficiary; (B) an individual
who bears a relationship to such beneficiary which is described in subparagraphs (A)
through (G) of section 152 (d)(2); the spouse of any individual described in subparagraph
(B); and (D) any first cousin of such beneficiary.").
35. I.R.C. § 529(e) (2) (B) (2006). Of course, the definition also includes their spouses
as well as any first cousin of the old beneficiary. I.R.C. § 529(e) (2) (C)-(D) (2006).
36. By parallel steps, I mean step versions, just like adopted persons, who are treated
like the blood related family members listed in the Tax Code definitions. I also think that a
wider range of relatives, like those found in section 152, makes sense to describe a uniform
definition of the taxpayer's family for all purposes. See infra Part IV.
37. IND. CODE § 6-4.1-1-3(a) (2006) ("'Class A transferee' means a transferee who is a:
•.. (3) stepchild of the transferor, whether or not the stepchild is adopted by the transferor;
[or] (4) lineal descendant of a stepchild of the transferor, whether or not the stepchild is
adopted by the transferor."); IOWA CODE § 450.9 (2005) (stepchildren are exempt from tax
on the net estate); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 140.070(1) (West 2008) (Class A beneficiaries in-
clude "stepchild," which like decedent's child is subject to a lower tax rate); MIcH. COMP.
LAWs § 205.202 (2003) (a stepchild or a lineal descendant of a stepchild is treated as a child
or a lineal descendant of a child to exempt the first $50,000 given to him from taxation);
NJ. STAT. ANN. 54:34-2.1 (West 2009) ("The transfer of property passing to a stepchild of
decedent.., shall be taxed at the same rates and with the same exemptions as the transfer
SUMMER 2009]
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former) and children equally, to the effect that neither is subject to
the state inheritance tax.38 Since many states are influenced by fed-
eral tax treatment, a uniform Federal approach to taxing steps may
increase the odds that states will do likewise.39
In addition, uniform tax treatment that addresses wealth trans-
fers may cause some states to change their intestacy laws, which
40presumptively reflect their residents' collective attitudes to in-
clude steps somewhere in their schemes. Currently, the few
of property passing to a child of said decedent born in lawful wedlock."); 72 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9116(1.2) (2008) (there is no inheritance tax from a child decedent twenty years old or
younger to either his parent or his stepparent); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-40-23(3) (2004)
(exemption from inheritance tax for $30k passing to decedent's stepchild or lineal issue or
any lineal descendant of his stepchild); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 67-8-302 (2008) (Class A benefi-
ciaries include decedent's stepchild, like his lineal descendants, for the purposes of the
state's inheritance tax).
38. MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 7-203(b) (1) (ii) (West 2008) (effective for those dece-
dents dying on or after July 1, 2000) ("'Child' includes a stepchild or former stepchild.").
Although property transfers from the decedent to the lineal descendants (or their spouses)
of a stepchild are exempt from Maryland inheritance taxes, such a transfer to a lineal ascen-
dant of that stepchild is taxed at 10%. See ALLAN J. GIBBER, GIBBER ON ESTATE
ADMINISTRATION § 5.6, at 5-4.2 (4th ed. 2005 & Supp. 2005) ("TG § 7-203(b) (1) raises the
question of whether a grandparent or a grandchild would include a step relationship. On its
face, the statute appears not to include such relationship. TG § 7-203(b) (2) (i) refers to a
'grandparent.' TG § 7-203(b) (2) (iv) and (v) refer to 'a lineal descendant of a child.' The
impact of this is to exempt from inheritance tax a bequest from a grandparent to a child of a
stepchild, (i.e., a lineal descendant of a child, including a stepchild), but to subject to tax a
bequest from that same child of a stepchild to the grandparent. Also subject to tax is a be-
quest from a grandparent to a stepchild of a child, who fails to qualify as a 'lineal
descendant' of the child."). Moreover, a transfer to a stepsibling would not qualify for the
Maryland inheritance tax exemption. Id. § 5.5. ("Property passing to a stepbrother is subject
to tax at 10%; property passing to a half brother is exempt.").
39. Otherwise, "[iun some states the stepchildren would bear a larger share of state
wealth transfer tax burden if state law imposes a higher rate on stepchildren than it does on
natural born or adopted children." Jeffrey N. Pennell, Tax Payment Provisions and Equitable
Apportionment, SM093 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1097 (2007); see also Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a
Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance within the Nontraditional Family, 24 IDAHO L.
REv. 353, 385 (1987-88) ("Unless the statute specifically provides a preferred classification
for stepchildren, they are deemed strangers to the blood and are subject to the higher in-
heritance tax rates.").
40. Intestacy triggers a state's default provisions. They are intended to reflect what
most decedents would want to happen to their property had they specified themselves in a
proper will. See Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Mat-
ters, 55 ALBANY L. REV. 927, 928-929 (1992). Alternatively, they may be used as instruments
of social policy. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the Implica-
tions for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006) (comparing the 1969 UPC with the 1990
UPC and stating "[w]hether intestacy law is really intended to carry out the average dece-
dent's intent, rather than to carry out public policy goals, is the subject of some debate.").
41. Most articles on this issue urge such inclusion. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, AdaptingIn-
testacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAw & INEQ. 1, 15-16 (2000); Margaret M. Mahoney,
Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917 (1989); An-
drew L. Noble, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in Pennsylvania: A Proposal for Reform, 64 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 835 (2003); Thomas M. Hanson, Note, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren: Cali-
fornia Leads the Way, But Has It Gone FarEnough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257 (1995).
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states2 that do include steprelatives in their intestacy laws often do
so right before the decedent's property would otherwise escheat to
the state43 and often after "laughing heirs" are allowed to take." The
current position of most intestacy laws is to assume a decedent
would prefer her property to devolve to a distant blood or adopted
relative rather than to "the devil (or the step) she knows."
This Article will explore the Tax Code and its rules that accord
steprelatives tax benefits both by inclusion in the definition of family
member or by exclusion from the definition of family member for
business entity attribution purposes or gift and estate tax anti-abuse
provisions. These inconsistencies in the treatment of steprelatives
have not yet been fully investigated despite their long-standing exis-
tence and easily identifiable status. Ironically, while there are articles
attempting to grapple with what constitutes a family member for tax
purposes in a nontraditional family relationship, there is a lack of
literature that attempts consistently to define, for tax purposes,
when a step is a family member, which should be an easier exer-
cise.45
42. Currently, only Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio, and South Carolina provide for
stepchildren. See Noble supra note 41, at 836 ("In fact several states [Alaska, Florida, Hawaii,
and Idaho] expressly exclude stepchildren from their plan of intestate distribution.").
43. See, e.g. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-104(e) (West 2008) ("If there is no sur-
viving blood relative entitled to inherit under this section, it shall be divided into as many
equal shares as there are stepchildren of the decedent who survive the decedent and step-
children of the decedent who did not survive the decedent but of whom issue did survive
the decedent."). With respect to these stepchildren, each receives one share in the pattern
of representation. Id. § 1-210. However, "[a]s used in this subsection, 'stepchild' shall mean
the child of any spouse of the decedent if such spouse was not divorced from the decedent."
Id. § 3-104(e).
44. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-104(d) (West 2008) ("If there is no
surviving parent or issue of a parent, or surviving grandparent or issue of a grandparent, it
shall be distributed one quarter to each pair of great-grandparents equally or all to the sur-
vivor, or if neither survives, all to the issue of either or of both of that pair of great-
grandparents by representation. In the event that neither member of a pair of great-
grandparents nor any issue of either of that pair survives, the quarter share applicable shall
be distributed equally among the remaining pairs of great-grandparents or the survivor of a
pair or issue of either of a pair of great-grandparents, in the same manner as prescribed for
a quarter share.") Can you name each of your great-grandparents? How about each of their
issue? That's why they are called "laughing heirs"-at decedent's death, they are laughing all
the way to the bank. For a discussion of the source of this term, see JESSE DUKEMINIER,
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN, & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND Es-
TATES 81-82 (7th ed. 2005).
45. The existing literature, for the most part, focuses either on steps and intestacy, see
supra note 41, on steps and other non-tax aspects of law, see, e.g., Mary Ann Mason, The Am-
biguous Stepparent: Federal Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445 (1995); Margaret
M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 491 (1987); Margaret M. Ma-
honey, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38
(1984), or on newer, or at least more recently discussed, types of relationships such as civil
unions or gay and lesbian relationships, see, e.g., Cain supra note 23; Patricia A. Cain, Federal
Tax Consequences of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 387 (2002); Lovas, supra note 39. But see
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This Article argues that steps should be treated uniformly
throughout the Tax Code. Part Two will discuss the tax conse-
quences of voluntary action by steprelatives. Part Three addresses
the treatment of transfers that occur during the marriage of a step.
Part Four analyzes the benefits and disadvantages conferred on
steps by income Tax Code provisions. Part Five discusses steps in
the context of family attribution rules for corporations and part-
nerships while Part Six analyzes wealth transfer taxes. Part Seven
then concludes by proposing a framework for the uniform treat-
ment of steps.
II. STATUS V. VOLUNTARY ACTION
The status of being a steprelative tells us virtually nothing about
the substantive familial relationship between two individuals. We all
know of steprelationships that are, for all practical purposes, either
non-existent or antagonistic as well as those that are harmonious
and loving. On the other hand, there are natural or adoptive fam-
ily relationships that cover that same gamut. Nonetheless, the
status of being a step currently does not, for the most part,46 alter
tax consequences and the presumption is that marrying someone
with children does not by itself create a parent/child relationship
between the steprelatives. 4' For example, in a situation where a
BridgetJ. Crawford, The Profits & Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate
Tax, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2005) (reviewing three estate tax sections (I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2032A,
and 6166) and proposing that they apply to "the full range of associational relationships that
function in fact as 'families.' "). Professor Crawford concludes, however, that "a uniform
definition would make the law easier to apply, but it would result in systematic over-taxation
and under-taxation. Instead the statutes should be revised to use unique terms that apply for
limited purposes." Id. at 3-4. Steps are one of the family relationships she considers in the
article.
46. When the taxpayer claims a step as a dependent by filing a joint tax return with
her spouse, that fact may or may not indicate that taxpayer's contribution of support for her
step. That is, the child's biological or adoptive parent may qualify for the dependency ex-
emption in his own right. See I.R.C. §§ 151, 152 (2006). Thus, it is primarily the status of
being a spouse but also indistinguishably or simultaneously the status of being a stepparent
that changes the stepparent's tax consequences.
47. Generally, no assumption is made for tax purposes merely because of the status of
being a step. That is currently the tax treatment of a parent's liability for his or her child's
taxes: while the allocation of a child's deficiency is generally a joint one for both spouses,
unless a stepchild is legally adopted by the parent's spouse, a stepchild's liability is not allo-
cated to the non-parent spouse, but remains the sole liability of the parent spouse. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.6015-3(d) (4) (iii) (1953). I.R.C. § 6013(h) (1) (2006) provides for the promulgation
of regulations on methods of allocating liability. However, a stepparent may benefit from
that status by being able to share the dependency deduction with his spouse who may actu-
ally provide the full support for her child, but the benefit more directly results from his
being able to file ajoint return with her and his status of being her spouse.
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stepparent voluntarily gives or bequeaths property to her stepchild,
she is acting like a family member and that relationship should re-
quire the stepparent and stepchild to be taxed like their biological
or adoptive equivalent. Nonetheless, the tax code does not recog-
nize this change in the familial relationship and continues to
exclude steprelatives from the definition of family member. Fair-
ness and uniformity dictate that the Tax Code recognize that such
transfers evidence an incorporation of the steprelative into the
family.
The potential for abuse provides another rationale for requiring
that the Tax Code treat steprelatives as family members. In DeBoer
v. Commissioner,5 when a taxpayer sold a two family apartment
house to his stepgrandson, he and his wife, the transferee's
grandmother, filed ajoint income tax return and claimed a deduc-
tion for the loss incurred in the sale. The tax court held that the
predecessor statute to the current loss disallowance section49 did
not disallow that loss despite the fact that, as the government had
contended, "by the use of the joint return [his wife was] benefiting
from a deduction which, under the terms of the Code is expressly
denied her .. . . 50 The court, however, rejected that argument. As
underscored by DeBoer, because of the abuse potential, during the
step's marriage to the parent of a biological or adopted child, the
step should be considered a family member for loss disallowance
purposes. 5' Likewise, if during the stepparent's marriage to the
stepchild's parent, the stepchild sells property to her stepparent at
a loss, but at the current fair market value, the loss to the stepchild
should be disallowed because of the abuse potential. If the mar-
riage terminates, however, and the same transaction occurs, the
loss should be allowed because, after the divorce, there is no
longer a bright line familial relationship. Lastly, because of the
greater abuse potential, transfers made from parents to stepchil-
dren should also be reviewed with the same strict scrutiny that is
applied to transfers from parents to biological and adopted chil-
dren. 2
48. DeBoer v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 662 (1951), aff'd per curiam 194 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1952).
49. I.R.C. § 24(b) (1939). The current related taxpayer loss disallowance section is
I.R.C. § 267 (2006).
50. DeBoer, supra note 48, at 664. This was a court reviewed opinion of the Tax Court
and, in dicta, the court stated "[a] different issue would be presented if [his wife] had
owned a part of the property in question." Id. (dictum).
51. If two septuagenarians marry and the step sells property to his stepgrandchild at a
loss, where he files a separate return from the natural parent, I.R.C. § 267 (2006) should not
apply to him.
52. See, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting although
transfers between family members should be subject to heightened scrutiny, such scrutiny
should be limited to the examination of objective facts); Estate of Constanza v. Comm'r, 320
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To illustrate the issue further, consider the following scenario:
mom and stepdad own stock in a corporation and, during their
marriage, mom gratuitously transfers her stock to her biological
daughter. For tax purposes, should the daughter's shares be
aggregated with her stepfather's during his marriage to her mother?
The stepdaughter's shares should be combined with her stepfather's
for two reasons. First, the transfer is indicative of a true familial
relationship; and second, it would be too easy for the mother and
stepfather to avoid aggregation in this manner, since before the
transfer, mom's shares would have been combined with her
husband's. Nonetheless, if the mother's marriage to the stepfather
ends in divorce, aggregation based on the natural parent's transfer
of stock during that marriage should cease at its dissolution as the
family bond has been severed and the abuse concern lessened.
Where a stepparent accepts or has accepted the tax benefits of
the "step" relative status, she should not be able to deny it in other
tax contexts. For example, under the current Tax Code,
steprelatives, due to their status, receive tax advantages through gift-
splitting, for gift tax purposes as an increased annual gift tax
54 5exclusion, lower marginal gift tax rates, use of both spouses'
E3d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[A] SCIN signed by family members is presumed to be a gift
and not a bona fide transaction."); Harwood v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 239, 258 (1984) ("Transac-
tions within a family group are subject to special scrutiny, and the presumption is that a
transfer between family members is a gift."), affd, 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpub-
lished table opinion); Kincaid v. United States, 682 E2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The
problem here, however, is that we deal entirely with an intra-family transfer, a circumstance
which has always prompted special scrutiny by the courts precisely because the genuineness
of the transaction cannot reasonably be inferred from any circumstantial assurances of a
business purpose."); Estate of Labombarde v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 745, 755 (1972); Estate of
Trenchard v. Comm'r, T.C. Mem. 1995-121 (Mar. 22, 1995).
53. 26 C.F.R. § 25.2513(a)(1) provides:
A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse shall, for the purposes of
this chapter, be considered as made one-half by him and one-half by his spouse, but
only if at the time of the gift each spouse is a citizen or resident of the United States.
This paragraph shall not apply with respect to a gift by a spouse of an interest in prop-
erty if he creates in his spouse a general power of appointment, as defined in section
2514(c), over such interest. For purposes of this section, an individual shall be consid-
ered as the spouse of another individual only if he is married to such individual at the
time of the gift and does not remarry during the remainder of the calendar year.
26 C.F.R. § 25.2513(a)(1) (2006). You must file a gift tax return to split gifts with your
spouse. See C.F.R. §§ 25.2513(b), 25.2513-1 (c), 25.2513-2.
54. I.R.C. § 2503 allows a taxpayer to make a tax-free gift in the amount of the annual ex-
clusion of a present interest in property to unlimited donees. I.R.C. § 2503 (2006). For 2009,
that amount is $13,000 per donee per year. Internal Revenue Service, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions on Gift Taxes, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/O,,id=108139,00.html#3 (last
visitedJune 13, 2009) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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unified credits,5 6  and their generation-skipping transfer tax
exemptions. In these contexts, to promote uniformity, the Code
should treat steps as family members and equivalent to natural and
adopted relatives. As it currently stands, the gift-splitting provision
allows stepparents indirectly to transfer property to stepchildren.
That is, absent statutorily defined gift-splitting, to secure twice the
annual exclusion amount or the combined lower marginal gift tax
rates, a spouse who wants to transfer property to his child would
need first to transfer part of the property to his wife who would
then transfer it to her stepchild.5 s Indeed, gift-splitting parallels the
tax treatment of gifts made by married couples in community
property states. To qualify for gift-splitting, the non-propertied
spouse must sign her consent to the application of the gift-splitting
provisions. 59 This voluntary action, which has significant legal
consequences, ° should trigger the equal treatment of steps and
61their natural or adopted relations.
Equity, uniformity, and abuse potential are the main reasons to
tax steps as family members like their biological and adopted
counterparts. A stepparent who treats his stepchild like his own
child by making gifts to her connects with her as a family member
and should, in all fairness, be taxed as a related individual.
Moreover, when a stepparent is married to the stepchild's parent,
not treating the stepparent as a relative creates too much tax
55. The gift tax rates range from 18% to 45% in 2007. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1)-(2) (B)
(2006). When gifts are split between spouses, the marginal rate applied to one-half of the
gift is often lower than that applied to the total.
56. I.R.C. § 2505 provides for a unified credit against the gift tax imposed under
§ 2501 in the amount of a maximum of $1,000,000 per U.S. citizen or resident. I.R.C. § 2505
(2006).
57. I.R.C. § 2631 provides for an exemption from the generation skipping transfer tax
imposed by § 2601 in an amount equal to that year's applicable exclusion amount. I.R.C.
§ 2631 (2006). For 2007 and 2008, that amount is $2,000,000 for each individual. I.R.C.
§ 2010(c) (West 2008).
58. For less liquid assets, this two-part transfer would likely involve some practical diffi-
culties and added costs.
59. I.R.C. § 2513(a) (2) (2006).
60. A consequence of gift-splitting is the joint and several liability for all gift taxes im-
posed on each spouse for that consent year. I.R.C. § 2513(d) (2006). Further, although for
estate tax purposes, the donor is the spouse who actually made the gift, for gift tax purposes,
the stepspouse is considered the donor of one-half of the property. I.R.C. § 2502 (2006).
That is, to the extent that the split gift used the non-donor spouse's unified credit for gift
taxes and her gift tax rates, those benefits are lost to her. Id.
61. Gift-splitting may be contrasted with filing a joint income tax return with the
child's parent. See supra notes 46-47. Although the benefits accrue to the donor who is the
child's biological relation and to the steprelative who is the recipient of the gift, the decision
to split a gift with one's spouse more closely parallels the consenting spouse's making an
indirect gift to her step than filing ajoint income tax return with a spouse that may be done
for a variety of tax saving reasons besides sharing in a dependency exemption deduction.
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avoidance potential. Finally, where some tax provisions enumerate
steps as family members, mostly for the purposes of securing tax
benefits, steps should be included in the definition of family for all
tax purposes to achieve uniformity.
III. ONCE A STEP, ALWAYS A STEP?
As described above, transfers from a step to a steprelative (e.g.,
from stepdaughter to stepmother) during the spouse's marriage
are sufficiently voluntary to consider those steprelatives as family
members for all Tax Code purposes. If that marriage ceases, how-
ever, should it trigger a re-classification of the relationship? The
answer should be: not necessarily.
For tax purposes, the bond established between steps by volun-
tary wealth transfers should not be presumed to be broken when a
stepparent dies or divorces the stepchild's biological parent with
respect to any gratuitous transfers the stepparent has made 6 or
continues to make to the stepchild. For example, if a stepparent
has given property to her stepchild and, after her divorce from the
stepchild's father, the stepchild sells that same property back to his
stepmother at a loss, the loss should be disallowed under the re-
lated party loss disallowance section because the step should be
considered part of the family with respect to this particular gift;
63
moreover, if the stepparent later sells the same property to a third
party at a gain, the same statute should reduce her gain by the loss
previously disallowed to the stepchild.64 However, those post-death
or post-divorce consequences should apply only to the specific
property gratuitously transferred to the step. After a divorce, the
stepmother (if she can still be called such) should be able to sell
other property to her stepson at a loss and she should be able to
recognize a loss. That is, that loss disallowance section for transfers
between related parties should not apply to the other property's
sale.
62. That includes a gift by way of gift-splitting.
63. I.R.C. § 267(a) (2006).
64. I.R.C. § 267(d) (2006). That is, suppose the stepmother gives her stepson property
with a basis to her of $10,000 and FMV of $20,000. After the stepmother divorces her hus-
band, the stepson sells that property back to his stepmother at its current FMV of $5,000.
Under I.R.C. § 267(a), that loss ($10,000 [the stepson's carryover basis] minus $5,000 [his
amount realized], resulting in a loss of $5,000) should be disallowed. When she later sells
the property for $30,000, rather than having a $25,000 gain, her gain should be reduced,
under I.R.C. § 267(d) by the previously disallowed loss to her stepson so that she should
have a $20,000 gain. I.R.C. § 267(a), (d) (2006).
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Furthermore, where a tax consequence that begins before the
divorce has post-divorce effects, the step should continue to be
treated as a family member. Specifically, if during the mother's
marriage the stepfather's loss on a sale of property to his stepchild
has been disallowed by statute, the ameliorative tax consequences
of that statute on a later sale at a gain should continue to apply
even after the mother and stepfather divorce. Thus, after the cou-
ple's divorce, if his stepdaughter sells that same property to an
unrelated third party at a gain, the related party loss disallowance
section should continue to classify the stepdaughter as family so
that her recognized gain at the later sale is diminished to the ex-
tent of the earlier loss disallowed to her stepfather. Moreover,
where current Code sections specifically treat ex-spouses as family
members, such as GSTT generation assignments, the step should
continue to be considered a family member after the marriage
ends.65
In contrast, where family attribution rules attach to steprelatives
66
in order to prevent tax avoidance, steps should not be treated as
family members upon the divorce or death of the natural parent.
In this context, the steprelative has not taken any voluntary action
evidencing a familial relationship and has not necessarily acted as a
family member. For example, if a biological father gave fifty shares
of stock to his son and if the stepmother who is married to the bio-
logical father also gave one share to her stepson, during the
couple's marriage all fifty-one shares of stock would be attributable,
as applicable, either to the father or to the stepmother. If the mar-
riage ceases, however, only the one share the stepmother actually
gave to her stepson should be attributed to her and only the fifty
shares the biological father gave to his son should be attributed to
him. This example illustrates the difference between a voluntary
transfer and a situation of abuse potential. Where the marriage
ends, only the voluntary transfer continues to have tax conse-
quences for the step because, with a divorce, the abuse potential
between ex-spouses is substantially reduced. This result follows
from the different rationale for treating steps as family members in
gift, rather than abuse potential situations.
65. I.R.C. § 2651 deals with GST[ generation assignments. See I.R.C. § 2651 (2006); see
also I.R.C. § 1361 (c) (1) (B) (2006) (including former spouses of lineal descendants).
66. See supra Part I; see also I.R.C. § 318 (2006) (defining family members to determine
the constructive ownership of stock).
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IV. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES
The Code's income tax provisions similarly treat steps inconsis-
tently. A number of income Tax Code provisions, including the five
provisions in the 2004 Tax Act67 and those income tax provisions
that provide for a multitude of additional benefits, including
medical benefits to stepchildren,68 treat stepchildren no differently
from biological or adopted children. Steps, however, are generally
not included in the definition of family member where such treat-
ment would create adverse tax consequences for the step taxpayer.
For example, steprelatives are not considered family members un-
der the related party loss disallowance statuteY. That omission has
widespread consequences as that Code section is referenced as the
standard definition of family member in many other anti-abuse
provisions. °
Occasionally, the Code includes steps in the definition of "re-
lated individuals," denying them some tax advantages. 7 This
negative consequence, however, seldom occurs; more often than
not, steps are not treated as related individuals, thereby escaping
72the policy objectives of anti-abuse provisions.
A. Income Tax Benefits to Steps
In 2004, Congress enacted legislation to provide for a uniform
definition of the term "qualifying child" that would be applicable
to five income tax sections providing benefits to taxpayers with
chldren.73 Section 152(f) (1) (A) (i) defines a child as"'dependent" lrn to73  1  )dfnsacida
"a son, daughter, stepson, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer. '7 4 A
"qualifying child" is any child, including the taxpayer's stepbrother
67. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
68. See infra Part W.A.
69. I.R.C. § 267(a) (2006). I.R.C. § 267(b)(1) (2006) describes persons and entities
related to the taxpayer as including "members of a family, as defined in subsection
(c) (4)." I.R.C. § 267(c) (4) (2006) provides that the "family of an individual shall include
only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and
lineal descendants." That identical definition of family appeared in I.R.C. § 267 under the
1954 Code.
70. See infra note 121.
71. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§21(e)(6)(A), 51(i)(1)(A), 125(e)(1)(D), 129(c), 170(g)(1)
(2006). Moreover, steps are denied a deduction for adoption expenses when the step is
adopting her spouse's child. See I.R.C. § 23(d)(1)(C) (2006).
72. See infra Part IV.B.
73. I.R.C. §§ 151-152 (2006).
74. I.RC. § 152(f)(1)(A)(i) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.152-3(a) (2008). The definition of a
child also includes an "eligible foster child of the taxpayer." I.R.C. § 152(f) (1) (A) (ii) (2006).
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or stepsister "or a descendant of any such relatives.",75 A dependent
child is a qualifying child 76 or a qualifying relative 77 and a qualifying
relative includes the taxpayer's stepbrother or stepsister" as well as
her stepfather or stepmother. 9 Under these uniform definitions,
steps are included in the head of household definition,80 the de-
pendent care credit, 81 the child tax credit, 82 the earned income tax
credit,83 and the personal exemption a taxpayer may take for her
dependents.
In addition, the Tax Code extends additional benefits to steps.
For example, for "no-additional-cost" fringe benefits, such as free
available airline travel or hotel rooms for employees, or "qualified
employee discounts," such as the perks offered to department store
employees, the term "employee" is defined broadly to include de-
pendent stepsons or stepdaughters. 84 Thus, when an airline
employee receives free tickets to Rome for herself and her step-
child or when the Best Buy employee allows his stepchild to
purchase a large screen television using his employee discount, the
employee does not have to pay any income tax on that additional
compensation.
Certain education tax benefits, such as education savings bonds85
and qualified tuition plans,86 are also available to steprelatives.
When income from education savings bonds is used to pay higher
817
education expenses, it is excludible from the taxpayer's income.
Those higher education expenses include tuition and fees of the
taxpayer's dependents for whom she is allowed a dependency ex-
emption deduction.8 8 Because it incorporates the dependency
exemption definitions, 9 this educational benefit applies to steps to
the same extent that it applies to blood or adopted relatives.
75. I.R.C. § 152 (c) (2) (B) (2006) (defining a "qualifying child").
76. I.R.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006).
77. I.R.C. § 152(a)(2) (2006). "Qualifying relative" is defined in I.R.C. § 152(d)
(2006).
78. I.R.C. § 152(d) (2) (B) (2006).
79. I.R.C. § 152(d)(2)(D) (2006).
80. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
81. I.R.C. § 21(b) (1) (A) (2006).
82. I.R.C. § 24(c)(1) (2006).
83. I.R.C. § 32(c) (3) (A) (2006).
84. I.R.C. § 132(h)(2)(B) (2006) (referring to the definition of "child" in I.R.C.
§ 152(0(1) (2006)); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.132-1(b)(5), 1.132-IT(b)(4) (2008).
85. I.R.C. § 135 (2006). This section was added by the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, Title VI, § 6009(a), 102 Stat. 3688 (1988).
86. I.R.C. § 529 (2006).
87. I.R.C. § 135(a) (2006).
88. I.R.C. § 135(c) (2) (A) (iii) (2006).
89. I.R.C. § 151(c) (2006).
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In addition,. Congress enacted the qualified tuition plan statute
both to provide an incentive for college savings and to clarify the
tax consequences of State pre-paid tuition programs and it clearly
applies to a wide variety of steprelations.90 In general, neither the
contributor nor the designated beneficiary of a qualified tuition
program has taxable income as long as earnings are used to pay
qualified higher education expenses.9' The definition of family
member in this provision includes, among other relatives,92 the re-
lationships in the dependency exemption definitions describing a
"qualifying relative."9'3 Thus, this tax benefit is available to a step-
child or stepchild's descendants, stepsibling, or stepparent (or any
of their spouses).
In 2001, Congress substantially expanded94 the definition of fam-
ily member to include the first cousins of the beneficiary, widening
the family circle beyond any other Code provision defining family
membership.' Moreover, if a qualified tuition program has excess
funds in an account or if the contributor wishes to change the des-
ignated beneficiary, she may benefit many types of steps without
triggering any adverse tax consequences.96 That is, substituting a
new beneficiary will not constitute a distribution, otherwise includ-
ible in income and subject to a ten percent penalty, so long as "the
new beneficiary is a member of the old beneficiary's family" and
that list contains a wide-ranging group of steps.97
90. S. REP. No. 104-281, at 160 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1580 ("The
Committee believes that it is appropriate to clarify the tax treatment of State-sponsored
prepaid tuition and educational savings programs in order to encourage persons to save to
meet post-secondary educational expenses.").
91. I.R.C. § 529(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
92. The statute also includes the beneficiary's spouse, the spouse of any of the indi-
viduals listed in I.R.C. § 152(d) (2) (2006), and any of the beneficiary's first cousins. I.R.C.
§ 529(e) (2) (A), (C)-(D) (2006).
93. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
94. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 402(a)(1)-(4) (A), (C), (D), (b)(1), (c)-(g), 115 Stat. 60-63 (sunset of termination on
December 31, 2010). The 2001 Act expanded the definition of a qualified tuition program
(QTP), provided for a maximum room and board allowance for QTPs, expanded the defini-
tion of "member of the family" to include first cousins of the original beneficiary, provided
for the exclusion of distributions that are applied to qualified higher education expenses,
and imposed an additional 10 percent tax on taxable distributions. H.R. REP. No. 107-84, at
79-81 (2001), reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 46, 154-156. In addition, the legislation clari-
fied that no deduction was available for money attributable to excludible earnings although
a deduction was allowable for funds not so matched. Id. at 168.
95. I am excluding such concepts as "objects of the bounty" found in I.R.C. § 2703
since that term is defined in addition to family members for the application of that section.
See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
96. I.R.C. § 529 (c) (2) (C) (ii) (2006).
97. I.R.C. § 529(c) (3) (C) (ii), (e)(2)(B) (2006).
Families for Tax Purposes
On the other hand, neither a child nor a stepchild may deduct
the interest on education loans if another taxpayer can claim the
stepchild as a dependent on his tax return since this provision
likewise refers to the dependency exemption criteria to define
"dependent."98
In another example of including steprelatives in the definition
of family member, steps may receive the many medical and health
tax benefits offered to their biological and adoptive counterparts.
First, the medical expense deduction is available for uncompen-
sated medical costs paid by the taxpayer for her dependents as that
term is used in the dependency exemption definitions,99 and
amounts paid for medical care for (or for the permanent loss of a
body part or function of or disfigurement) the taxpayer's depend-
ent as defined in that Code section may be excluded from the
taxpayer's income. 00 That "dependent" definition statute is also the
pivotal provision for steps' coverage in Archer MSA's,'0 ' health sav-
ings accounts, 2 and for distributions from government plans for
103health and long-term care insurance.
Finally, steprelatives also benefit from other miscellaneous tax
provisions that reference the dependency exemption definitions to
classify the taxpayer's dependents including the exclusion for em-
ployer provided group legal services1 0 4 and the exemption from the
ten percent penalty for early distributions from a qualified plan
made to unemployed individuals to the extent that they are used to
pay health insurance costs for the taxpayer, her spouse, or her de-
pendents. 5 Likewise, when amounts are distributed early from a
nonqualified plan due to an "unforeseeable emergency" relating to
the participant, his spouse or his dependent (using the depend-
ency exemption definitions like in the case of distributions to their
98. I.R.C. § 221(c), (d)(4) (2006).
99. I.R.C. § 213(a) (2006).
100. I.R.C. § 105(b), (c)(1) (2006).
101. I.R.C. § 220(d) (2) (A) (2006). An Archer MSA is a medical savings account where
you can provide for your future medical costs. According to the IRS, the benefits of such an
account include 1) a deduction for non-itemizers, 2) tax-free interest and growth of your
assets in the account, 3) tax-free distributions if paying "qualified medical expenses," 4)
contributions that roll over into the next year if unused, and 5) portability. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 969, HEALTH SAVINGS Accours AND OTHER TAX-
FAVORED HEALTH PLANs 8 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf.
102. I.R.C. § 223(d) (2) (A) (2006). This section references I.R.C. § 213 (2006) as well.
See supra note 14.
103. I.R.C. §402 (l)(1) (2006).
104. I.R.C. § 120(a), (d)(4) (2006).
105. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(D)(i)(III) (2006).
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blood and adopted dependents) steps are exempt from gross in-
come inclusion.
1 0 6
B. Anti-abuse Income Tax Provisions and Steps
Anti-abuse provisions governing transactions between family
members are necessary to prevent taxpayers from undermining the
purposes of the tax laws. Congress allows a taxpayer who sells in-
vestment real estate at a loss, for example, to recognize the
economic loss in that transaction through a tax deduction.' 7 Sales
between "family members," however, present opportunities for
taxpayers to manipulate the timing of a loss, so that when a tax-
payer sells property at a loss to a family member, Congress denies
that deduction.0 8 There are a few anti-abuse provisions that equate
steps with biological relatives, but they are the exception. In most
instances, steps are not covered by these statutes. 0 9 The anti-abuse
individual income tax provisions that treat steps as biological or
adopted equivalents are generally very narrow subsections. For ex-
ample, in the Code section for cafeteria plans, in the subsection
that denies an income tax exclusion for highly compensated par-
ticipants where the plan discriminates in their favor, or to benefit
their spouse or dependent, their dependents are referenced to the
dependency exemption definitions.' Likewise, the exclusion for
dependent care assistance programs disallow the exclusion where
the employee pays a related individual, as defined under that sec-
tion,"' for such childcare.12 Finally, such a limited application of
the dependency exemption definitions occurs once in the myriad
of subsections of the charitable deduction section where a taxpayer
may take a deduction for the costs of maintaining only non-
dependent taxpayer-related students in her household 3 and simi-
106. I.R.C. § 409A (2006).
107. I.R.C. § 165(c) (2) (2006).
108. I.R.C. § 267 (2006).
109. However, steps and their biological or adopted counterparts are both denied the
qualified tuition and related expense deduction under I.R.C. § 222(c) (3) (2006) where they
can be claimed as dependents by another taxpayer under I.R.C. § 151 (2006). The same is
true for the deduction for health savings accounts under I.R.C. § 223(b) (6) (2006).
110. I.R.C. § 125(e)(1)(D) (2006); see also id. § 21(e) (6) (A) (2006); id. § 51(i) (1) (A)
(2006); id. § 129(c) (2006); id. § 170(g)(1) (2006). Each of these statutes reference I.R.C.
§ 152 (2006). I.R.C. § 21(e) (6) (A) (2006) references I.R.C. § 151(c) (2006) and that, in
turn, references the definitions in I.R.C. § 152 (2006).
111. I.R.C. § 152(c) (1) (2006).
112. I.R.C. § 129(c) (2) (2006).
113. I.R.C. § 170(g)(3) (2006) (defining the term as "relationships described in sub-
paragraphs (A) through (G) of section 152(d)(2)"). On the other hand, I.R.C.
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larly restricts the work opportunity credit for payments to such
related persons.
1 14
On the negative tax consequence side, however, the 1986 en-
actment of a provision taxing the unearned income of a minor at
her parents' tax bracket when it is higher than the child's own rate,
envisioned including both parents and stepparents in those calcu-
lations. The legislative history of this section, which was enacted
to prevent income shifting from wealthy parents to their lower tax
bracket children, uses the terms parent and stepparent as equiva-
lents" 6 and the temporary regulations indicate that purpose as
well.
1 7
§ 170(f) (10) (H) prohibits a deduction where there is an understanding that the organiza-
tion would provide a personal benefit such as life insurance or an annuity contract to the
transferor or his family; that family is defined without reference to section 152 and does not
include steps. I.R.C. § 170(f)(10) (H) (2006) ("For purposes of this paragraph, an individ-
ual's family consists of the individual's grandparents, the grandparents of such individual's
spouse, the lineal descendants of such grandparents, and any spouse of such a lineal de-
scendant.").
114. I.R.C. § 51(i)(1)(A) (2006) (referring, likewise, to "relationships described in sub-
paragraphs (A) through (G) of section 152(d) (2)").
115. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-514 § 1411(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (enacting
§ 1(i), effective for taxable years after 1986 (§ 1411 (c))); see also H.R. REPl. No. 99-841
(1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4855-4857. The Omnibus Recon-
ciliation Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101-508, § 11101(d) (2), 104 Stat 1388, re-designated subsec. (i)
as (g) for taxable years after 1990 and the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of
2005, Pub.L. 109-222, § 510(a), (c), 104 Stat. 1990 (2006), extended the application of this
section to unearned income of a minor under the age of 18 instead of under the age of 14.
There are special rules for determining the parent for purposes of this section-if the par-
ents are unmarried, the parent is the custodial parent as determined by section 152(e) and,
if they are married, but filing separate returns, the parent is the one with the greater taxable
income. I.R.C. § I (g) (5) (A)-(B) (2006). Parents may elect to include their child's unearned
income in their own return. I.R.C. § I (g) (7) (2006).
116. H.R. REP. No. 99-841 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075,
4855 ("The top rate of the parents is deemed to be the top rate applicable to individuals
unless the parent assigns an unused rate bracket amount at a lower rate to the child. Earned
income and unearned income derived from assets received from sources other than a par-
ent that are placed in a qualified segregated account are taxed at the child's rate. Property
eligible to be placed in a qualified segregated account includes earned income, money, or property re-
ceived from someone other than the parent or step-parent, and property received by reason of the parent s
or step-parent's death.") (emphasis added). The Senate amendment was basically the same as
the House Bill. Id. ("The Senate amendment generally is the same as the House bill, except
that the tax payable by a child on the parental source unearned income is equal to the addi-
tional amount of tax that the parent would be required to pay if the child's parental source
unearned income were included in the parent's taxable income .... The conference
agreement follows the Senate amendment except that the provision is applied to all net
unearned income of a child under 14 years of age regardless of the source of the assets cre-
ating the child's net unearned income.")
117. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.1(i)-IT (Q. & A. 13-14) (1987) ("Answer 13: The amount of a
parent's taxable income that a child must take into account for purposes of section 1(i)
where the parent files ajoint return with a spouse who is not a parent of the child is the total
taxable income shown on such joint return .... Question 14: In determining a child's share
of the allocable parental tax, is the net unearned income of legally adopted children,
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Only rarely does equal treatment of steprelatives with biological
relatives result in adverse tax consequences. There are virtually no
adverse corporate, partnership, or estate and gift tax consequences
because steps are not considered family members for those provi-
sions. That is because the related persons loss disallowance
section"8 that defines the taxpayer's family to "include only his
brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants" is in effect." 9 In so doing, this
anti-abuse provision is inapplicable to steps. First, that statute itself
denies a deduction for losses between related persons, including
members of the taxpayer's family,'2° but does not include steps.
Second, and even more significant, that Code section is referenced
in well over sixty other Code provisions, 2' many of which deal with
children related to such child by half-blood, or children from a prior marriage of the spouse
of such child's parent taken into account in addition to the natural children of such child's
parent? Answer 14: Yes. In determining a child's share of the allocable parental tax, the net
unearned income of all children subject to tax under 1 (i) and who use the same parent's
taxable income as such child to determine their tax liability under section 1(i) must be
taken into account. Such children are taken into account regardless of whether they... are
children from a prior marriage of the spouse of such child's parent.").
118. I.R.C. § 26 7 (a)(1) (2006) defines a deduction for "any loss from the sale or ex-
change of property, directly or indirectly, between persons specified in any of the
paragraphs of subsection (b)."
119. I.R.C. § 267(c) (4) (2006) (family members are defined in this section for the pur-
poses of applying the constructive ownership of stock under section (b)). I.R.C. 267(g)
(2006), however, provides that the loss disallowance section shall not apply to any transfer
between spouses or ex-spouses incident to a divorce that are covered under section 1041,
which itself disallows not only losses, but also gains between such persons.
120. I.R.C. § 267(b)(1) (2006).
121. References to section 267 related parties and to 267(c) (4) family members abound
and are found in such Code sections as I.R.C. §§42(d)(2)(D)(iii); 45D(f)(2)(B); 50;
56(e)(3)(B)(ii); 101(j)(2)(B)(i), (3)(B)(ii)(I); 108(e)(4)(B); 121(d)(8)(B); 144(a)(3)(A);
147(a)(2)(A); 162(n)(3); 163(e)(3)(C)(ii), (j)(4), (1)(6), (n)(4); 165(l)(2)(D);
167(e)(5)(B), (g)(5)(C); 168(k) (2) (E) (iv) (I), (3)(C)(ii)(II); 170(a)(3), (e)(5)(C)(ii);
179(d)(2)(A); 179A(b)(2)(B); 197(f)(9)(C)(i)(I)-(II); 213(d)(11)(B); 221(d)(1)(C);
263A(h) (3) (D) (i) (I); 274(e)(4); 280A(d) (2) (A); 280F; 304(b) (5) (A) (i) (II); 318;
336(d)(1)(A); 351(g)(3)(B); 355(d)(7)(A), (g)(2)(B)(ii)(IlI); 382; 409(n)(3)(A)(ii);
447(h)(1)(B)(ii)(I), (h)(2)(A); 453(f)(1)(B); 464(c)(2)(E); 465(b)(3)(C); 468B(d)(3);
4 69 (g)(1) (B); 483(e) (2); 503(b)(6); 512(b) (1) (J)(i); 514(c) (9) (B) (iii); 613A(c) (8) (D) (ii),
(d) (1) (E); 631(c) (1); 643(i) (2) (B) (i) (note that section 643(i) (2) (B) (i) incorporates spouses
in addition to family members as defined in section 267(c) (4), stating "[i] n applying section
267 for purposes of the preceding sentence, section 267(c) (4) shall be applied as if the family
of an individual includes the spouses of the members of the family."); 664(g)(5)(A)(i);
679(a)(3)(C) (by referencing 643(i)(2)(B)(i)); 685(c)(2)(A); 707(b)(1)(B); 755(c)(1);
871(h)(4)(B); 877(g)(2)(A)(i); 904(h)(3)(B); 936(h)(3)(D)(i)(I), (ii); 988(c)(1)(E)(I);
1031(0(3); 1033(i)(3); 1060(e)(3); 1202(c)(3)(A), (j)(2)(C); 1235(d); 1237(a)(2)(A);
1239(c)(1)(C), (c)(2); 1259(c)(4)(A); 1397(a)(2)(B); 1400B(e)(5); 1400C(e)(2)(A)(i);
4946(a)(3)-(a)(4); 4951(e)(4)(H); 4975(e)(4)-(5) (however, under § 4975(e)(6), for the
purposes of paragraph (2) (F), family includes "spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, and any
spouse of a lineal descendant."); 4951(f)(6)(A)(iii), (B)(ii); 4985(a)(2); 5881(c)(2);
6038A(c)(2)(B); 6166(b)(2)(D), (g)(1)(D); and 6664(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (2006).
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family attribution rules to determine constructive ownership for
corporate and partnership anti-abuse objectives. There are very few
sections that, by referencing that loss disallowance statute, restrict
benefits to steps, but they include a provision that denies steps a lar-
ger exclusion for certain life insurance proceeds.
2 2
Similarly, the anti-abuse grantor trust rules,2 3 which tax the
grantor as the owner of trust income when she transfers property
but retains certain ownership interests or control, 14 include only
the following members in the grantor's family: her "father, mother,
issue, brother or sister" 12 5 in the definition of a "related or subordi-
nate party." That restricted definition, inapplicable to steps, limits
some of the anti-abuse grantor trust consequences.126
V. FAMILY ATTRIBUTION RULES FOR CORPORATIONS
AND PARTNERSHIPS
Like many income tax anti-abuse provisions, corporate and part-
nership family attribution rules refer to definitions of family that do
not include steps. While the mere status of being a step should not
122. The general rule, with respect to certain employer-owned life insurance contracts,
is to exclude from gross income not more than the total premium or other amounts ex-
pended by the policy owner for the insurance contract. However, the reduced exclusion has
an exception for amounts paid to, among certain other beneficiaries, the insured's family as
defined under section 267(c) (4). See I.R.C. § 101(j)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
123. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (2006). The grantor trust rules were enacted in their present
form in the 1954 Code. Pub. L. 591, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 68 Stat. 3, 226 (Supp. A 1954).
Parts of the grantor trust rules were enacted earlier, with the earliest enacted as part of the
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-176, ch. 234, § 219(g) (1924). This statute is the predeces-
sor statute to the current I.R.C. § 676 (2006), which treats the grantor as the owner, for
income tax purposes, of his revocable trust. However, the statutory form of sections 671-678
first appeared in the 1954 legislation.
124. S. REP. No. 1622, at 86-87 (1954), reprinted in 2 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE REVENUE ACT OF 1954 wiTH LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND CONGRES-
SIONAL DOCUMENTS 86-87 (Bernard D. Reams Jr. ed., 1982) ("[T]he rules for determining
when the grantor should be treated as the substantial owner of the trust should be set forth
in the statute rather than left to regulations .... Under the regulations, the grantor will be
taxed on the trust income if certain related or subordinate trustees hold such a power. Un-
der the bill, the grantor will not be taxed if he can establish that the related or subordinate
trustee is not acting in accordance with the grantor's wishes. However, the grantor must
overcome a presumption that the related or subordinate party is subservient to him."). See
Schulz v. Comm'r, 686 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The main thrust of the grantor trust
provisions is that the trust will be ignored and the grantor treated as the appropriate tax-
payer whenever the grantor has substantially unfettered powers of disposition. The hallmark
of such discretion is that the grantor can act unilaterally or with the concurrence of some-
one who is not an 'adverse party.'").
125. I.R.C. § 672(c) (2) (2006).
126. Because steps are not family members, I.R.C. §§ 674(c) and 675(3) (2006), which
refer to grantor's relatives, are not applicable to steps.
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make a step a family member, the transfer of stock or other entity
ownership interests, directly or indirectly, between a taxpayer and a
step should cause steps to be classified as their biological or adopted
equivalents for all tax purposes, including entity attribution and
wealth transfer rules. However, because of the impact of the appli-
cation of the related party loss disallowance section and the lack of
steps in its definition of family members,127 there are many corpo-
rate and partnership anti-abuse provisions that do not apply to
steps.128
Specifically, a partnership tax section, 12 9 which itself cites to the
relationships in the related party loss disallowance statute and
which is also referenced in other Code sections,3° deals with sales
or exchanges between a partner and a partnership; where a part-
nership constitutes a controlled partnership, certain loss
deductions are disallowed and gains from those sales or exchanges
are treated as ordinary income."' Control is defined as more than a
fifty percent ownership of the capital interest or the profits inter-
est132 and those interests are determined by applying "the rules for
constructive ownership of stock provided in section 267(c) ....
127. See supra Part IV.B.
128. See supra note 121.
129. I.R.C. § 707 (2006).
130. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 42(d)(2)(D)(iii); 45D(f)(2)(B); 101()(3)(B)(ii)(I); 108(e)(4)(B);
121 (d) (8) (B); 144(a) (3) (A); 147(a) (2) (A); 163(j) (4), (1) (6); 168(k) (2) (E) (iv) (I); 170(a) (3);
179(d)(2)(A); 179A(b)(2)(B); 197(f)(9)(C)(i)(1)-(II); 221(d)(1)(C); 304(b)(5)(A)(i)(II);
351(g)(3)(B); 355(d)(7)(A); 465(b)(3)(C); 469(g)(1)(B); 512(b)(19)(J)(i); 514(c)(9)(B)(iii);
613A(c) (8) (D) (ii); 631(c) (1); 643(i) (2) (B) (i); 685(c) (2) (A); 871(h) (4) (B); 87
7 (g) (2) (A) (i);
936(h)(3)(D)(i)(I), (ii); 988(c)(1)(E)(I); 1033(i)(3); 1060(e)(3); 1202(c)(3)(A), (j)(2)(C);
1235(d); 1259(c)(4)(A); 1397(a)(2)(B); 1400B(e)(5); 1400C(e)(2)(A)(i); 5881(c)(2);
6038A(c) (2) (B); 6664(d) (3) (B) (ii) (I) (2006).
131. I.R.C. § 707(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
132. For example, I.R.C. § 707(b) (1) provides for the disallowance of:
losses from sales or exchanges of property (other than an interest in the partner-
ship), directly or indirectly, between-(A) a partnership and a person owning,
directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital interest, or the profits in-
terest, in such partnership, or (B) two partnerships in which the same persons own,
directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the capital interests or profits interests.
In the case of a subsequent sale or exchange by a transferee described in this para-
graph, section 267(d) shall be applicable as if the loss were disallowed under section
267(a) (1). For purposes of section 267(a)(2), partnerships described in subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph shall be treated as persons specified in section 267(b).
I.R.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006). I.R.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006) reads similarly with respect to recog-
nized gains.
133. I.RC. § 707(b) (3) (2006). The 1954 Code version of this section had the same ref-
erence to section 267 family attribution rules to determine the ownership of a capital or
profits interest in a partnership to match the construction stock ownership rules. Pub. L.
591, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 68 Stat. 3, 244 (Supp. A 1954).
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Because steps are not included in these partnership attribution
rules, this Code section, as well as other anti-abuse provisions ref-
erencing that partnership tax section's definition, is inapplicable to
steps. However, because those sections generally reflect voluntary
actions, such as a sale or exchange, they clearly should apply to
steps to the same extent they pertain to the blood or adopted rela-
tives listed under the related party loss disallowance section.
Similarly, for constructive ownership of corporate stock under a
corporate tax provision, an individual's family members are "his
children, grandchildren, and parents"13' and only adopted children
are considered "a child by blood.",36 Yet, that Code section, to-
gether with several other Code sections that incorporate its
definition of family,137 do not extend to steps, regardless of whether
the transferor was or is a step and despite the transferor's qualifica-
tion for, or receipt of, tax benefits deriving from that step
relationship.
Likewise, defining a "controlled group of corporations," such as
a parent-subsidiary or brother-sister controlled group of corpora-
tions, 13  the statute 39  applies constructive ownership rules
applicable to an individual's blood or adopted "children, grand-
children, parents, and grandparents"' 40 and not to her step
equivalents.
The statute14 ' defining S Corporations similarly excludes steps
from its definition of a family member. 4 1 In that statute, family
134. I.R.C. § 318 (2006).
135. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). This language is the same as that found in that
same section under the 1954 Code. Pub. L. 591, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 68 Stat. 3, 99-100
(Supp. A 1954). This section was referenced in the 1954 Code to determine constructive
ownership in such sections as 302(c) (1) and 304(c) (2). See id. at 86-87, 90.
136. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1) (B) (2006).
137. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§41(b)(3)(D)(ii); 105(h)(5)(B); 168(h) (6) (F) (iii) (III);
263A(e) (2) (B) (ii); 269A(b) (2); 269B(e) (2) (B); 301(e) (2); 302(c) (1), (2) (A), (B) (i)-(ii),
C(ii); 304(b) (1), (3) (B) (iii) (I), (c) (3) (A)-(B); 306(b) (1) (A) (ii), (iii), (c) (4); 338(h) (1),
(3) (A) (iii), (C)(iii); 355(d) (8) (A), (e) (4) (C) (ii), (g)(3)(B); 356(a)(2); 367(c)(2);
382(1) (3) (A) (i)-(iv); 409(n) (1) (B), (p) (5) (B); 414(m) (6) (B); 416(i) (1) (B) (i) (I), (iii), (I),
(II); 441(i)(2)(B); 453(f)(1)(A), (g)(3) (referring to § 1239(b), which in turn references
§318); 465(c)(7)(D)(iii), E(i); 512(b)(13)(D)(ii); 664(g) (2) (B), (C), (g)(5)(B);
856(d) (5) (A), (B); 871 (h) (3) (C) (i), (ii), (iii); 881 (b) (3) (B); 897(c) (6) (C); 904(h) (6) (B);
958(b); 1042(b)(2); 1059(e)(1)(A)(ii)(I); 1060(e)(2)(B); 1239(b)(2); 1372(b); 2036(b)(2);
4975(f) (6) (C); 6038(e) (2) (A)-(B) (2006).
138. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
139. I.R.C. § 1563 (2006) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 88-272, Title II, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 120
(1964)).
140. I.R.C. § 1563(e) (6) (A)-(C) (2006).
141. I.R.C. § 1361 (2006) (added to the 1954 I.R.C. by the Subchapter S Revision Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 2, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982)).
142. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(1)(B) (2006) (defining "members of a family" as a common an-
cestor, his lineal descendants, and the spouses or former spouses of the lineal descendants).
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members are treated as one shareholder and, while steps are omit-
ted, that definition encompasses "any eligible foster child of an
individual within the meaning of section 152(f) (1) (c)" as a blood-
related family member.
1 4 3
Finally, Congress imposes penalties1 " on a wide variety of self-
dealing transactions 45 between private foundations and disqualified
persons,4 6 which includes certain family members.4 4 Those family
members consist of an individual's "spouse, ancestors, children,
grandchildren, great grandchildren, and the spouses of his children,
grandchildren, and great grandchildren.' 4' The rules, moreover,
use the related party loss disallowance statute's family relationships 49
for attribution rules defining entities that are disqualified persons.150
That means that there are no steps that are considered disqualified
persons for the purpose of self-dealing. Yet, these rules were enacted
"[iln order to minimize the need to apply subjective arm's-length
standards, to avoid the temptation to misuse private foundations for
noncharitable purposes, to provide a more rational relationship be-
tween sanctions and improper acts, and to make it more practical to
properly enforce the law ... ,,51 The omission of comparable ste-
prelatives from the category of disqualified persons does not make
sense today.
By contrast, there are some Code provisions 52 that assist family
farm businesses that produce negative tax consequences for steps
by omitting them from the definition of family. Enacted in 1976,'
143. I.R.C. § 1361 (c)(1)(C) (2006).
144. I.R.C. § 4941 (a)-(b) (2006).
145. I.R.C. § 4941 (d)(1) (2006) ("For purposes of this section, the term "self-dealing"
means any direct or indirect-(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of property between a pri-
vate foundation and a disqualified person; (B) lending of money or other extension of
credit between a private foundation and a disqualified person; (C) furnishing of goods,
services, or facilities between a private foundation and a disqualified person; (D) payment of
compensation (or payment or reimbursement of expenses) by a private foundation to a
disqualified person; (E) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of
the income or assets of a private foundation; and (F) agreement by a private foundation to
make any payment of money or other property to a government official (as defined in sec-
tion 4946 (c)), other than an agreement to employ such individual for any period after the
termination of his government service if such individual is terminating his government ser-
vice within a 90-day period.").
146. I.R.C. § 4946(a) (2006). Moreover, I.R.C. § 507(d) (2) (C) (ii) (2006) incorporates
I.R.C. § 4946 (2006) disqualified persons in its definition of a related person.
147. I.R.C. §4946(a)(1)(D) (2006).
148. I.R.C. § 4946(d) (2006).
149. I.R.C. § 267(c) (4) (2006).
150. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(3)-(4) (2006).
151. H.R. 419,91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.CA.N. 1645,1665.
152. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 447 (2006).
153. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title II, § 207(c) (1) (A), 90 Stat. 1538
(1976).
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the family farm exception to the requirement of accrual account-
ing provides small farms with the benefit of using the cash method
of accounting, allowing certain farmers to defer taxes. 54 According
to that Code provision, a family corporation is one where "at least
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote, and at least 50 percent of all other classes of
stock of the corporation, are owned by members of the same fam-
ily.' 155 For that purpose, family members are defined as including
the "individual, such individual's brothers and sisters, the brothers
and sisters of such individual's parents and grandparents, the an-
cestors and lineal descendants of any of the foregoing, a spouse of
any of the foregoing, and the estate of any of the foregoing.'' 56 No
steps are counted to achieve family corporation status and that en-
tity's accounting benefits. Similarly, other statutes,"57 which
reference that statute 8 to define a "family-owned corporation,' 59
omit steps from their beneficial exception.' 6
VI. WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES
A. Estate Tax Benefit Statutes and Steps
For estate taxes, there are two sections reducing a taxpayer's tax
liability where steps are equated with at least some corresponding
natural or adopted family members and thereby may reduce their
transfer tax liability. 6' One of these statutes62 values the decedent's
family farm, or the real estate connected with a family business, at its
154. H.R. 658, 94th Cong. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 2989 ("In view of
this, your committee believes it is appropriate to require corporations, and certain partner-
ships, engaged in farming use an accrual method of accounting with the capitalization of
certain preproductive period expenses. Your committee, however, has excepted from this
requirement certain small or family corporations in order to continue the cash basis method
of accounting essentially for all those but the larger corporations engaged in farming.").
155. I.R.C. § 447(d) (2) (C) (2006).
156. I.R.C. § 447(e) (2006).
157. I.R.C. § 354 (2006).
158. I.R.C. § 447 (2006).
159. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 354(a) (2) (C) (ii) (II) (2006).
160. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (2006) provides for the nonrecognition of gain or loss on stock
exchanged in a reorganization. I.R.C. § 354(a) (2) (C) (i) (2006) provides that, generally,
nonqualified preferred stock shall not be given nonrecognition treatment; however, under
I.R.C. § 354(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2006), that limitation shall not apply to a family-owned corpora-
tion, as defined in II for that clause.
161. I.R.C. § 2057(d) (2) (B) (2006).
162. I.R.C. § 2032A (2006). This section was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. 94-455, Title XX, § 2003(a), 90 Stat. 1856 (1976).
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actual use,163 rather than at its "highest and best use." The special,
reduced value applies to a member of decedent's family who is a
qualified heir 64 and who continues to use the land for those
special purposes for a certain period of time. For the purpose of that
Code provision, decedent's family is defined as including his ances-
tor, spouse, his or his spouse's lineal descendant, his parent, or the
spouse of any his or his spouse's lineal descendant. 65 By including
his spouse's lineal descendents as well as their spouses, the dece-
dent's stepchildren, stepgrandchildren, and stepgreat-grandchildren
are treated as the decedent's own lineal descendants. However, a
stepparent, in contrast to a parent, would not qualify in this con-
text.
Further, a short-lived statute, now repealed' 66 for decedents dy-
ing after 2003,167 created an estate tax deduction with a maximum
amount of $675,000168 for the adjusted value of a qualified family-
owned business interest of the decedent that is both included in
his gross estate and acquired by, or passed from, decedent169 to a
"qualified heir." The terms "qualified heir"1 70 and decedent's "fam-
ily members' ' 7' are defined by reference to the definitions used in
the estate tax special valuation statute earlier discussed. 172 More-
over, the value of a qualified family-owned business interest under
the short-lived statute incorporates a reduction for indebtedness
used to pay the educational and medical expenses of the decedent,
163. The allowed reduction may not, however, exceed $750,000, indexed for inflation.
I.R.C. § 2032A (a) (2)-(3) (2006). For decedents dying in 2007, the decrease may not exceed
$940,000. Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-06-53.pdf (last
visitedJune 13, 2009) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
164. That is, a family member who acquired the property from the decedent. See I.R.C.
§ 2032A (e)(1) (2006).
165. I.R.C. § 2032A (e) (2) (A)-(D) (2006).
166. I.R.C. § 2057 (2006). This provision was enacted as § 2033Aby Pub. L. 105-34, Title
V, § 502(a), 111 Stat. 847 (1997) and renumbered and amended as § 2057 by Pub. L. 105-
206, Title VI, § 6007(b), 112 Stat. 807 (1998). See H.R. REP. No. 205-148 (1997) (Conf.
Rep.); S. REP. No. 105-33 (1997) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. RE'. No. 105-220 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
167. I.R.C. § 2057(j) (2006).
168. This amount was coordinated with the unified credit. I.R.C. § 2057(a)(2)-(3)
(2006). Thus, for decedents dying in 2003, the last year of the deduction, "the sum of the
QFOBI [section 2057] deduction and the applicable exclusion amount [unified credit]
cannot exceed $1.3 million." Form 706, Instructions, at 25, col. 2 (Rev. Aug. 2003).
169. I.R.C. § 2057(b) (2) (2006) (stating the business interest must be "acquired by any
qualified heir from, or passed to any qualified heir from, the decedent (within the meaning
of I.R.C. § 2032A(e) (9)).").
170. I.R.C. §2057(i)(1)(A) (2006) (defining a "qualified heir" as in I.R.C.
§ 2032A(e) (1)).
171. I.R.C. § 2057(i) (2) (2006) (defining a family member as in I.R.C. § 2032A(e) (2)).
172. I.R.C. § 2032A (2006).
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her spouse, or dependents, as that last term is categorized by the
dependency exemption definitions.73
Other provisions that incorporate the definition of family mem-
ber contained in the estate tax special valuation statute include,
besides the temporary estate tax deduction,' those that deal with:
(1) adequate disclosure to allow the statute of limitations to apply
to the transfer for gift tax purposes,
17
5 (2) exempt organizations,
176
(3) charitable remainder trusts, 7 and (4) qualified conservation
easements.
178
Another tax statute179 enables a decedent's estate to postpone
paying estate taxes for the first five years after the decedent's
death18 while also allowing the estate to pay taxes in yearly install-
181ments over a ten year period, in years six through fifteen.
173. I.R.C. § 2057(d) (2) (B) (2006).
174. I.R.C. § 2057(i) (2) (2006).
175. The adequate disclosure statute is I.R.C. § 6501 (2006). Treas. Reg. § 301.6501 (c)-
1 (f) (4) (2006) provides, with respect to the disclosure of non-gifts, if a transfer is made to a
member of the donor's family (as defined in section 2032A(e) (2)) "in the ordinary course
of operating a business," the transfer is "deemed to be adequately disclosed," even if it is
"not reported on the gift tax return," provided that the item is "properly reported by all
parties for income tax purposes."
176. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (15) (A) (ii) (II) (2006) (regarding certain non-life insurance
companies' employee's family members).
177. I.R.C. §§ 664(g)(2), (g)(3)(F), (g) (5) (A) (i) (2006).
178. I.R.C. § 2031(c) (8) (D) (2006).
179. I.R.C. § 6166 (2006).
180. During the first five years after decedent's death, only interest payments must be
made. I.R.C. § 6166(f)(1) (2006).
181. I.R.C. § 6166(a)(1) provides:
If the value of an interest in a closely held business which is included in determining
the gross estate of a decedent who was (at the date of his death) a citizen or resident
of the United States exceeds 35 percent of the adjusted gross estate, the executor may
elect to pay part or all of the tax imposed by section 2001 in 2 or more (but not ex-
ceeding 10) equal installments.
I.R.C. § 6166(a) (1) (2006). I.R.C. § 6166(a) (3) (2006) allows for a five year deferral with just
interest payments due before the 10-year installment payment period. The predecessor to
section 6166 was enacted in 1958 as part of the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 and
stated:
[A]lthough not removing any Federal estate tax in these cases, your committee hopes
that by spreading out the period over which the estate tax may be paid, it will be pos-
sible for the estate tax in most cases to be paid out of earnings of the business, or at
least that it will provide the heirs with time to obtain funds to pay the Federal estate
tax without upsetting the operation of the business. Your committee believes that this
provision is particularly important in preventing corporate mergers and in maintain-
ing a free enterprise system.
H.R. REp. No. 85-2198, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1959-2 C.B. 709, 713 (Sec. 6
"Installment Payments of Estate Tax Attributable to Investments in Closely Held Business
Enterprise"). The House estimated that the revenue loss from this provision would amount
833
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Unfortunately, although estates often take advantage of the bene-
fits of both the estate tax special valuation statute and this
provision,'82 steps are accorded different tax treatment under these
two sections. Under the statute that defers estate tax payments, the
aggregation rules benefit the decedent by allowing her to combine
business interests with her family's to qualify for the section's tax
relief. However, the definition of family that is used in that statute
references the related party loss disallowance section's definition of
family members,'8 3 with the result that the estate tax postponement
statute does not include any steps as part of decedent's family. This
lack of aggregation of a step's stock or partnership interest can
deny the applicability of this section both initially8 4 and its contin-
ued application on a subsequent transfer to a step.185
B. Anti-abuse Gift Tax Statutes and Steps
In 1990, Congress enacted legislation s6 to discourage unrealistic
valuations of gifts of partial business and other property interests
where the transferor or applicable family members continued to
hold an interest in the business or other property. In addition,
these statutes addressed unrealistic values then rampant in family
to approximately $35 million in the first full year of operation. See Estate of Roski v.
Comm'r, 128 T.C. No. 10, 26-27 (2007) ("Congress enacted section 6166 because the exist-
ing law was 'inadequate to deal with the liquidity problems experienced by estates in which a
substantial portion of the assets consist of a closely held business.' H.R. 94-1380, at 30
(1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 735, 764. ... ").
182. Like section 2032A, section 6166 was also added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. 94-455, Title XX, § 2004(a), 90 Stat. 1862 (1976). See BoRIs I. BIrrER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIrTs 137.5.1, at 1 (RIA 2007)
("Another tax concession, similarly rationalized as a method of preserving family enter-
prises, is the election to value the real property of a farm or other business under § 2032A by
reference to its current use, rather than its normal market value. Both sections can be used
if their separate requirements are met."); KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND
WEALTH PRESERVATION: STRATEGIES & SOLUTIONS 46.02[7], at 7 (RIA 2007) ("Section
6166 can be used in combination with section 2032A. The qualification and acceleration
requirements are not the same for these two sections and so each must be separately exam-
ined whenever an issue involving both matters arises.").
183. I.R.C. § 267(c) (4) (2006).
184. See I.R.C. § 6166(b)(2)(D) (2006) (for the purposes of paragraph (1), "All stock
and all partnership interests held by the decedent or by any member of his family (within
the meaning of section 267(c) (4)) shall be treated as owned by the decedent.").
185. See I.R.C. § 6166(g) (1)(D) (2006). A transfer of the property may accelerate the
payment of decedent's estate tax liability; however, if the transferee is a member of the trans-
feror's family, there is an exception to this immediate payment due. Again, this section
refers to the definition of family members under I.R.C. § 267(c) (4) (2006), so that a transfer
to a step will not fall under this special safe harbor exception.
186. Chapter 14 was added by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, § 11602(a), 104 Stat. 1388, and codified as I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (2006).
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agreements and restrictions. According to the legislative history,
"the Committee [was] concerned about the undervaluation of gifts
valued pursuant to the Treasury tables .... Because the taxpayer
decides what property to give, when to give it, and often controls
the return on the property, use of the Treasury tables undervalues
the transferred interests in the aggregate, more often than not.
1 87
The first statute enacted in this legislation' 8  deals with family
business transfers of interests likely to appreciate (e.g., common
stock) from the older generation to the younger generation with
the older generation retaining an interest frozen in value, such as
voting preferred stock ("applicable retained interest"). 89 For the
purposes of this section, the transferor's family consists of her
spouse, her or her spouse's lineal descendant, and the descen-
dant's spouse ' 9° and her "applicable family member" includes her
spouse, her or her spouse's ancestor, or that ancestor's spouse.19,
Legally adopted individuals are treated the same as blood rela-
tives. 9 2  Thus, transfers to the transferor's stepchildren,
stepgrandchildren, or stepgreat-grandchildren are subject to the
anti-abuse rules of this statute; the transferor's stepparents and
stepgrandparents, however, are not, although parents-in-law and
similar ancestral in-laws are covered by this anti-abuse provision.
The second statute enacted in the 1990 legislation' 93 defines
gifts and their value when a partial interest in the same property
is transferred to family members. Unless the retained interest is a
qualified one, 94 it is valued at zero, to the effect that the donor is
taxed on a gift of the total value of the property' 95 despite having
187. Report on Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, S. 3209, 101st Cong., 136
Cong. Rec. 30485, 30538 (1990) (enacted).
188. I.R.C. § 2701 (2006).
189. I.R.C. § 2701(b)(1) (2006) (defining an "applicable retained interest" as "any in-
terest in an entity with respect to which there is-(A) a distribution right, but only if,
immediately before the transfer described in subsection (a)(1), the transferor and applica-
ble family members hold (after application of subsection (e)(3)) control of the entity, or
(B) a liquidation, put, call, or conversion right.").
190. I.R.C. § 2701 (e)(1) (2006).
191. I.R.C. § 2701 (e) (2) (2006).
192. I.R.C. § 2701 (e) (4) (2006).
193. I.R.C. § 2702 (2006).
194. A qualified interest must be in the form of a qualified annuity, unitrust or qualified
remainder interest. I.R.C. § 2702(b) (2006). A qualified interest is valued under § 7520. See
Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)-(d) (2008).
195. I.R.C. § 2702 (2006) applies to transfers to "a member of the transferor's family"
(i.e., the donor's spouse, his (or his spouse's) ancestor or lineal descendant, his sibling (or
his sibling's spouse)) where the transferor or "applicable family member" (i.e., the trans-
feror's spouse, his ancestor, or his ancestor's spouse) retains an interest in a trust or in
property treated as if held in a trust. See I.R.C. §§ 2702(e), 2704(c)(2), 2701(e)(2),
2702 (c)(1), 2702(a)(3)(ii) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5 (2008). To the extent that
§ 2702 applies, the decedent must retain his income interest in the form of a qualified inter-
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actually transferred only a partial property interest. For the pur-
poses of this provision, family members include an individual's
spouse, sibling, any ancestor or lineal descendant of the individ-
ual or his spouse, or any spouse of a sibling, ancestor or lineal
descendant of the individual or his spouse. 96 Thus, while ex-
panded in comparison to the definition under the gift tax family
business transfers valuation statute' 7 to include the individual's
siblings and their spouses, this definition does not provide cover-
age for any steprelatives. Applicable family members under these
two sections are defined precisely the same; neither includes the
transferor's stepancestors.198
The third statute enacted in this 1990 legislation" allows the
value stated in certain agreements, options, rights or restrictions
to control when transferred to family members or other "natural
objects of the transferor's bounty" only where that value satisfies
certain requirements, including where the agreement is not a tes-
tamentary device but a bona fide business arrangement. This
provision is unusual in that, under the regulations, the transfer-
ees encompassed in its rules extend beyond members of the
family and specifically include non-family members in its defini-
tion of "the natural objects of the transferor's bounty."
200
Stepchildren are included in the definition of family member,2"'
but other steps may also be included under the definition of "the
natural objects of the bounty." The regulations under this section
define the transferor's family to include the same individuals as
those described in the gift tax family business transfers valuation
statute °2 as family members 2 and, therefore, embrace the lineal
descendants of the transferor's spouse.
The regulations under this third statute do not define the
"natural objects of the transferor's bounty," but, in promulgating
the regulations, the IRS explained that the phrase need not be
restricted to those who are related by blood or marriage, but re-
est or his retained interest will be valued at zero. I.R.C. § 2702 (a) (2) (A) (2006). This means
the value of any retained nonqualified interest is valued at zero. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-
3(f) (iii) (2008) ("[A]n interest is non-contingent only if it is payable to the beneficiary or
the beneficiary's estate in all events.").
196. I.R.C. § 2702 (e) which defines family members under I.R.C. § 2704 (c)(2). See
Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(1) (2006).
197. I.R.C. § 2701 (2006).
198. I.R.C. §2702(a)(1) refers to the definition in §2701(e)(2). See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2701-1(d) (2) (2008).
199. I.R.C. § 2703 (2006).
200. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3) (2008).
201. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9841005, 1998 WL 700563 (June 4, 1998).
202. I.R.C. § 2701 (2006).
203. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2703-1 (b) (3), 25.2701-2(b) (5) (2008).
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flects the "concept [that] has long been part of the transfer tax
system .... ,204 That term-natural objects of the transferor's
bounty-has been described as "a somewhat elusive concept not
admitting of one clear definition that would apply to all cases, but
rather one best decided on a case-by-case basis."20° When applying
the term, the court needs to find sufficient evidence "to suggest
that an unrelated party shares a relationship with decedent such
as to be effectively considered a member of the family.,
206
Finally, the fourth statute enacted in the 1990 legislation
ignores the value of certain lapsing rights or certain restrictions
in a family business unless those limitations represent actual
qualifications of the business interests. For the purpose of
determining an "applicable retained interest," this statute
requires looking to the gift tax family business transfers valuation
statute 207 under which control means holding at least fifty percent
(by vote or value) of the corporate stock2 0 ' at least fifty percent of
the capital or profits interest in a partnership, or a general
partner interest in a limited partnership. Moreover, to the
extent that an interest is held indirectly by an individual through
a corporation, partnership, trust, or other entity, it is attributable
to that individual. 2 1 ' This fourth provision first deems a lapse of
corporate or partnership voting or liquidation rights in a
controlled2 1 2 entity as a gift or bequest,212 computed by taking the
204. Special Valuation Rules, 57 Fed. Reg. 4250, 4253 (1992) ("One commentator re-
quested that the final regulations define the term 'natural objects of the bounty.' The final
regulations do not provide a definition of this term. This concept has long been part of the
transfer tax system and cannot be reduced to a simple formula or specific class of relation-
ship. The class of persons who may be the objects of an individual's bounty is not necessarily
limited to persons related by blood or marriage.").
205. Gloeckner v. Comm'r, 152 F.3d 208, 210 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'gT.C. Mem. 1996-148
(1996).
206. Id. at 215. In Gloeckner v. Comm'r, the court ruled that two loans and being a minor
beneficiary in decedent's will were insufficient evidence that decedent and a business associ-
ate had a close personal relationship. In dicta, however, the court stated:
In this respect we do not foreclose the possibility that the existence of past transfers
of property at significantly less than market value, or of arrangements designed to do
the same, might, in appropriate circumstances, give rise to an inference that the
transferee was effectively considered a member of decedent's family.
Id.
207. I.R.C. § 2701 (2006).
208. I.R.C. § 2701 (b) (2) (A) (2006).
209. I.R.C. § 2701 (b) (2) (B) (i) (2006).
210. I.R.C. § 2701 (b) (2) (B) (ii) (2006).
211. I.R.C. § 2701(e) (3) (2006). If such attribution applies, "any transfer which results
in such interest being treated as no longer held by such individual shall be treated as a trans-
fer of such interest." Id.
212. Control is defined under I.R.C. § 2704(c) (1) by I.R.C. § 2701(b) (2) (2006).
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excess of the value, undiscounted for these rights, of all her entity
interests immediately before the lapse over their value
immediately after the lapse. 4 Second, this statute contains rules
requiring that certain restrictions or liquidation rights be
disregarded in the context of a family transfer of a corporate or
partnership interest. 25 Exempt from this second rule are "any
commercially reasonable restrictions" stemming from the entity's
financing with an unrelated person 216 or a restriction required by211
law. With respect to these provisions, family is defined as the
individual's spouse, an ancestor or lineal descendant of the
individual or spouse, the individual's sibling, or any spouse of
that ancestor, lineal descendant, or sibling.2 I Thus, again,
stepchildren, stepgrandchildren, and stepgreat-grandchildren are
included in this list while the transferor's stepascendants or
stepsiblings are not. Finally, the attribution rules applied here are
those applicable under the gift tax family business transfers
valuation statute.1 9
C. Generation Skipping Transfer Tax Statutes and Steps
The current generation skipping transfer tax (GSTT) was en-
acted in 1986220 and applies to transfers to "skip persons" who may
or may not be family members, but who in general belong to at
least one's grandchildren's generation. They are described as
"skip persons" because the transfer to them is one that otherwise
would avoid one generation of transfer taxes (i.e., either gift or
estate taxes). To determine whether that an individual is a "skip
person" and skips a generation (or more than one generation) of
taxes, the GSTT assigns individuals to a generation and that clas-
sification differs depending on whether the person is a lineal
descendant of the transferor 22 or the transferor's spouse (or for-
213. I.R.C. § 2704(a)(1) (2006).
214. I.R.C. § 2704(a) (2) (2006).
215. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(1) (2006).
216. I.R.C. § 2704 (b)(3)(A) (2006) (i.e., a person not related to either the transferor
or transferee or to either of their family members).
217. I.R.C. § 2704(b) (3) (B) (2006).
218. I.R.C. § 2704(c) (2) (2006).
219. I.R.C. § 2701(b)(2), (e)(3) (2006).
220. The first GSTr was enacted in 1976 and was repealed and replaced by the 1986
version. Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title XX, § 2006(a), 90 Stat. 1879 (1977), repealed by Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 1433(c), and amended by Pub. L. No. 99-514, Title XIV, § 1431 (a), 100 Stat. 2718.
See H.R. REP. No. 99-841 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
221. I.R.C. § 2651(b)(1) (2006).
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mer spouse) ,22 or of another relation.223 Family relationships in-
clude those created by blood, half-blood, adoption, and marriage
(current or former) . There is a special rule on adoption since it
would be easy to shift generations by means of adoption, particu-
larly with respect to adult grandchildren.225 Thus, for determining
generation assignment, not only must the adopted individual be
legally adopted, but he must be both younger than eighteen years
old when adopted2 2 6 and "not adopted primarily for the purposes
of avoiding" the GSTI. 27 Divorced individuals retain the same gen-
eration assignment they had when they were married, as do their
descendants. 228 Thus, family members for GSTT purposes include
stepchildren and their spouses as well as stepgrandchildren and
their spouses, etc. Ex-spouse's parents and ex-spouse's grandpar-
ents continue to be considered part of the transferor's family, but
the transferor's own stepparent or stepgrandparents are not.
While the GSTT includes a lot of different relations as family
members, including those related to his former spouse and, there-
fore, some steps, it is surprising that former in-laws, including new
members of his in-laws' family, are treated as more closely related
than a stepbrother or stepniece or stepgrandnephew even when
the transferor has voluntarily made a gift to him or her.
VII. A UNIFORM RULE
The sections above demonstrate the disparate ways the Tax Code
treats steprelatives. This Article recommends that Congress include
222. I.R.C. § 2651(b) (2) (2006) ("An individual who is a lineal descendant of a grand-
parent of a spouse (or former spouse) of the transferor (other than such spouse) shall be
assigned to that generation which results from comparing the number of generations be-
tween such grandparent and such individual with the number of generations between such
grandparent and such spouse.").
223. I.R.C. § 2651(d) (2006). Unrelated individuals are assigned to a generation by
their age difference to the transferor: those not more than 12 years younger than the
transferor's generation are members of his generation, those more than 12 ', but not more
than 37 years younger than the transferor are members of the generation right below the
transferor (like his child), those more than 37 but not more than 62 years younger than
the transferor are assigned to the generation two generations below him and so on for each
25 years thereafter. Id.
224. I.R.C. §§ 2651 (b) (3), 2651(c) (2006).
225. Treas. Reg. § 26.2651-2(b) (2005). The example given in the regulation is one in
which the transferor adopts her twenty-year-old grandchild. The example concludes that,
despite the adoption, the grandchild remains a skip person and that the transfer from the
transferor to the grandchild remains a direct skip. Id.
226. Treas. Reg. § 26.2651-2(b) (3) (2005).
227. Treas. Reg. § 26.2651-2(b) (4) (2005).
228. I.R.C. §§ 2651(c), 2651 (b) (2) (2006).
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steps as counterparts to the current blood and adopted relatives
listed in each of the Code's major sections defining family.229 The
application of each of those sections incorporates a situation that
involves a transfer or other voluntary action between steps or pre-
sents a circumstance with abuse potential that makes such a
designation prudent at least during the step's marriage to the
step's biological or adoptive relative. This recommendation is sim-
ple to apply and affords the same familial treatment to steps as is
currently available to them in many income tax benefit sections.
At the opposite extreme, Congress can fashion a "facts and cir-
cumstances" test to determine which steps should be considered as
family members for all tax purposes. If Congress wanted to adopt a
more fluid definition despite the potential for increased litiga-
2301 231
tion, the regulations regarding adoptions for GSTT purposes
provide a good list of criteria that could be applied to define a step
relationship as family. "The most significant factor for those GSTT
purposes is whether there is a bona fide parent/child relationship
between the adoptive parent and the adopted individual, in which
the adoptive parent has fully assumed all significant responsibilities
229. I.R.C. §§ 267, 318, 447, 707(b), 1361, 1563, 2032A, 2651, 2701(e), 2704(c) (2006).
On the one hand, there is a good argument that a uniform definition of family members for
all tax purposes should be a broad one. The fairly recently enacted qualified tuition plans
statute provides a good prototype for an expansive definition of family: spouse, child or
stepchild (or either's descendants), lineal ancestors, stepparents, siblings or stepsiblings (or
either's children), aunts and uncles, first cousins, and certain in-laws. I.R.C. § 529 (2006). See
supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text. Moreover, such a wide-ranging list would com-
plement other current, related legislation. The 2004 uniform definition of "child" for the
purposes of five Code sections is likewise broad and includes many steps (and in-laws) as
relatives: the taxpayer's son, daughter, stepson, or stepdaughter (or any of their descen-
dants); brother, sister, stepbrother or stepsister (or any of their descendants); father or
mother or an ancestor or sibling of either; stepfather or stepmother; and son-in-law, daugh-
ter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law or sister in law. I.R.C. § 152(a)(1)-(2),
(c) (2), (d) (2) (A)-(G), (f) (1) (A) (i), (4) (2006). Of course, inexplicably lacking from this
list are stepgrandparents (or any ancestor of either a stepfather or stepmother), stepaunts or
stepuncles, or stepin-laws comparable to those blood or adopted "qualifying relatives." On
the other hand, it would be premature for this paper to recommend such a sweeping
change that would expand not only all of the current Code sections to steps, but also the
definition of family members for all tax contexts. Before making that kind of recommenda-
tion, there should be an analysis of its effects on each provision, especially an economic
analysis of the costs, and of its comportment with each statute's legislative purpose. That
kind of review is beyond the limits of this Article.
230. For tax purposes, my preference is to ignore actual relationships so that it is easier
to apply the tax rule and the result is less likely to be subject to litigation. An individual may
hate their biological parent, for example, but that would be irrelevant for attribution or
wealth transfer purposes. For those who like facts and circumstances tests, however, the one
applied to GSTT adoptions appears to be suitable in this context.
231. The definition of "adopted individual" under Treas. Reg. § 26.2651-2(b) (2005), al-
though a facts and circumstances analysis, is clearly necessary since adult adoption of
grandchildren would become commonplace in order to alter generation assignment and
avoid the GSTr.
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for the care and raising of the adoptive child."232 Another impor-
tant factor is the age of the child when adopted (the younger the
better) .23
Alternatively, and somewhere between these two suggestions,
Congress can adopt a rule acknowledging step relationships that
are most likely to exhibit family ties. A step relationship, which is
most likely to be characterized as family-like, is one that was cre-
ated during a stepchild's minority, either before age eighteen or
earlier, such as before age fourteen. If there is such a step relation-
ship at the core, all relatives of the stepchild that are included in
the list of family members under the applicable Code section de-
fining family would be covered by that tax provision.
A final possibility to define a step as a family member, without
using an age benchmark, might be to focus on a step's actions: ei-
ther a step's voluntarily transferring assets to her step relation or a
step's enjoying certain tax benefits for that step.34 Any one volun-
tary action would make the step a family member under all of the
tax statutes and that step's relatives would also be included under
the applicable list of family members.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Currently, steps may receive favorable tax treatment under
many income tax benefit sections. Among the many tax advan-
tages for which steps may qualify are the earned income tax and
232. Id.
233. Treas. Reg. § 26.2651-2(b)(4)(i) (2005). Likewise, in the GSTT context, the gov-
ernment considers the relationship between the adopted child and their natural parents--
their "absence or incapacity," for example, may indicate a non-GSTr motivation. See Treas.
Reg. § 26.2651-2(b) (4) (ii) (2005).
234. Clearly, the voluntary transfer of assets indicates a relationship between steps that
parallels their natural and adopted counterparts. Although less patent, the ability to claim
tax benefits for a step also implies such an affinity; at any rate, during a marriage, it would
be inconsistent and affect a double benefit to treat this action in any other way. Contrast
those easily identifiable relationships of steps to the unclear relationships involved in using
the term "objects of the ... bounty" contained in the regulations under one of the statutes
enacted in the 1990 gift tax legislation. I.R.C. § 2703 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1 (b) (3)
(2008). One of the main components of testamentary capacity is that the testator must know
"the natural objects of his or her bounty." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 8.1 (2003).
SeeFrances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REv. 199, 207 (2001);
Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardi-
anship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 397, 418, n.127 (1997);Jan E. Rein, Relatives
by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 763-
765 (1984). Although concededly long-applied in the trusts and estates area, because that
term requires an individual analysis of many facets of a relationship, it is more likely to invite
litigation than determining who is a step and whether he is the gratuitous transferee of a
property or entity interest. See supra notes 199-206.
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dependent care credits, dependency exemption deductions, and
various fringe, education, legal, and medical benefits. 2 5 However,
steps are not presently treated as family members for corporate
entity or wealth transfer tax purposes and they therefore benefit
tax-wise from the omission. For equity and uniformity, the sub-
stance of their family relationship as construed by their voluntary
acts that resemble their biological equivalents should be recog-
nized by the Tax Code for those purposes as well.
There is no requirement that wealthy and powerful individuals
share their property with their steps and it is not the purpose of
this Article to suggest that they do so, but if they do, they are giv-
ing rise to a relationship that is no different from the natural or
adoptive parent/child or other statutorily applicable family rela-
tionship and that fact should be reflected in the Tax Code.
Moreover, a step relationship, once established, should continue
to be recognized for some tax purposes even when the marriage
creating the step relationship has ended due to separation, di-
vorce or death.2 36 It is the voluntary transfer of property, the
voluntary acceptance of benefits derived from the step relation-
ship, or the voluntary sharing of corporate control, from a donor
or decedent to a current or former step, that highlights the
equivalence of the step relationship with its natural or adoptive
counterpart.
237
This Article recommends that steps be included as counter-
parts to the current blood and adopted relatives in each of the
major Code sections defining family,'238 but also offers alternative
solutions narrowing the list of steps included in the definition.
While much of the literature is wrestling with definitions of family
for non-traditional families, it is long overdue to consider at least
some steps as family members for all tax purposes. Currently,
many steps enjoy tax benefits resulting from their inclusion or
exclusion in the definition of family. It is both reasonable and
equitable to classify steps as family for corporate attribution rules
and wealth transfer tax purposes as well.
235. See supra Part IVA.
236. See supra Part II.
237. This proposal is consistent with the movement in family law that views parenting
responsibilities in line with familial behavior. Thus, the A.L.I. definition of parent includes a
parent by estoppel or a de facto parent. See supra note 5, § 2.03.
238. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267,318, 447, 707(b), 1361, 1563, 2032A, 2651, 2701(e), 2704 (c)
(2006).
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